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The arguments presented in this section are constructed, in first place, to show 
the crucial importance of our subject of study throughout this piece of work, taking into 
account economic and financial perspectives, to show the repercussions on the causes 
and consequences of a firm’s diversification strategies. Secondly, we describe some 
arguments on the importance of being diversified and expanding the lines of business in 
a global perspective, since the current markets are more internationalised. Thirdly, we 
provide some arguments to understand the diversification decisions and their 
consequences on the firm’s choices to provide premiums to shareholders in terms of 
dividends. Fourthly, we feel the needs to expand our horizon of study by understanding 
the differences in institutional factors and country effects on diversified firms and, as a 
result, we provide some arguments about the legal systems, financial systems, and 
development of the economy. Finally, we present the objectives to be attained along the 
present study and, at the same time, the structure of the body document.  
 
I.1. Diversification significance and its real consequences. 
 
Firms are able to choose between having single-segment operations (non 
diversified firm) or multi-segment operations (diversified firm). When the firm expands 
its lines of activities across industries by acquiring or establishing other business it is 
called a diversified company. For instance, firms pursue diversification strategies by 
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establishing production business units in different industrial sectors.  In short, firms 
diversify strategically looking for the advantages over the costs of being involved in 
multi-segment activity and prefer to stay focused when it is unworthy.  Moreover, the 
procedure of diversifying entails firm’s resources that are required to be exploited 
exceptionally and consequently time efforts, making it a process that can create or 
destroy new opportunities for the companies. The main role of diversification is to 
create new options of value for shareholders in manners that they cannot obtain by 
reducing their risk on investments by themselves. 
When a company’s production activities are sufficiently to support core business 
product line, it is called related diversification. Related activities bring firms several 
abilities and resources that are easily transferable across the segments, creating a 
distribution and production chain. Related diversification allows provide firms to enjoy 
an allocation of the resources throughout its ramifications. Unrelated diversification 
strategies appear when a firm extends its lines of production business into fields 
dissimilar to its conventional product line. Unrelated activity carries with it increased 
business risks and exploitation of complementary processes within the firm, among 
others.  
The puzzle presented in the diversification literature of the last two and a half 
decades offers conflicting results. This extensive literature documents the motives for 
diversifying, the fact that diversification can face firm value positively, and the 
circumstances under which firms experiment with costs of diversification (see Palich, et 
al., 2000). Earlier studies attempt to explain that the benefits of being a multi-segment 
corporation overcome its costs, impacting positively on shareholders’ wealth (Jensen 
and Ruback, 1993). Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that diversification is a value 
creating strategy under some circumstances (Villalonga, 2004). However, the prevailing 
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perception among financial researchers throughout a large empirical support suggests a 
value destroying effect for multi-segment firms (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and 
Ofek, 1995; Servaes, 1996; Rajan et al., 2000) and also that the level of product 
diversification has been leaning downward. This so called "discount" in the financial 
literature is attributed when comparing business segments in diversified firms with the 
medians of industry single-segment firms.  
Another perspective argues that diversification has both value enhancing and 
destroying effects on firm value (Grant, et al., 1988; Palich et al., 2000). Markides 
(1992) argues that as a firm becomes more diversified it gets away from its principal 
business and the benefits of being a multi-segment firm at the margin decreases. High 
levels of diversification increment managerial and organizational complexity, and 
coordination costs begin to emerge due to the complexity of integration, and so 
consequently top managers tend to exert incongruity decisions (Grant, et al., 1988). As a 
result, Markides (1992) infers that beyond a certain point the marginal benefits of 
diversification are best explained as a decreasing function. In the same vein, the 
“Intermediate Model” proposed by Palich et al. (2000) suggests that diversification has 
positive revenues, but the returns fall beyond some point where the optimal level is 
reached. 
Arguments to the option for diversifying rely on three main perspectives 
according to Montgomery (1994): the agency theory, the resource based view and 
market power perceptions. Studies on product diversification offer some explanations 
between agency problems and diversification decisions (see for instance, Denis et al., 
1997): i) managers diversify to increase firm size and to obtain benefits from the 
prestige and power resulting from managing a big company (Jensen, 1986; Stulz 1990), 
ii) Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that firms with large amounts of free cash flow 
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may invest more than they should. Since diversified firms have different divisions it is 
more difficult for managers to allocate capital and monitor activities efficiently, so then 
diversified firms achieve more agency costs because it is relatively easy for the 
divisional manager to cheat central management since diversified companies are 
required to report only limited accounting information for their business segments. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) posit that shareholders suffer an escape on their benefits due 
to the fact that managers use diversification to entrench themselves and invest according 
to their preferences, iii) Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that to mitigate the risk from the 
human capital firms might diversify, or as Jensen and Mecking (1976) arguments on the 
reduction of firm specific risk for managers that affect value in order to influence their 
future compensation. 
According to the resource based view, we can observe that firms with great 
capacity to achieve resources and capabilities might be attributable to transfer their 
abilities across business segments and be involved in diversification practices. Then 
firms look at strategies to expand their activities or utilize their resources to add value in 
production or improve competitive advantage (Rumelt et al., 1991). In this scheme 
economies of scope arise and diversification strategy becomes one of the most 
approachable techniques for the organization of in economic activities and in the 
exploitation of scale economies (Penrose, 1959). Finally, diversified firms enjoy market 
power advantages that are to some extent inaccessible to their single-segment 
equivalents. Owing to internal market efficiencies, multi-segment firms can benefit 
from the advantage of easy access to external funds and finance growth, and they can 
also transfer capital across businesses within their pertinent segmentation of operations 
(Meyer et al., 1992). Moreover, the increment of market power is determined by 
predatory pricing, future higher prices, and sustained losses that can be founded through 
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cross-subsidization, whereby the firm uses the profits obtained in one specific segment 
to support another (Tirole, 1995). 
A diversified firm consists of numerous divisions operating across industries. It 
is well defined that their activities permit the creation of internal capital markets that 
might provide easier and lower cost financing than the external capital markets. 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) show that multi-segment companies can improve the 
funding of profitable projects throughout internal capital markets. Therefore, the 
creation of internal capital markets allows firms to reduce asymmetric information 
problems by mitigating agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Stein 1997)1.  
Therefore, this argument is confirmed since single-segment firms enjoy more 
transparency and, hence, are subject to less information asymmetry and obtain more 
benefits from external capital access (Nanda and Narayanan, 1999).  
On the one hand, the literature points out that the benefits of diversified 
companies over non-diversified ones comes from: i) less risk to the firm (Grant, 1998), 
ii) increment on the debt capacity (Lewellen, 1971), iii) creation of internal capital 
markets (Rumelt, 1982), iv) Managers have information advantages over external 
capital markets (Williamson, 1975), v) mitigation of failures in product, labour and 
financial markets (Khanna and Palepu, 1999).  On the other hand, the costs of multi-
segment activities are associated mainly with the agent-principal problem described by 
Jensen (1986), and consequently to the creation of inefficient internal capital markets 
(Stulz, 1990). 
 Our interest in diversified companies relies on the fact that the documented 
discount is mostly attributed to US firm samples (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and 
Ofek, 1995; Rajan, et al., 2000; Bowen and Wiersema, 2005; 2008), while evidence for 
                                                 
1 See for instance, Williamson (1975) and Stein (1997) for literature on the benefits of internal capital 
markets. Recent empirical work focused on the possible negative effects of internal capital markets, see 
for example, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan et al. (2000) 
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Eurozone countries is not provided as far as we know. In summary, we provide 
evidence on both the benefits and costs of diversified firms by taking into account the 
important and moderating role played by the different types of diversification on the 
premium or discount that diversified firms trade at. The inevitable questions to be 
answered of all the above arguments should be: Are diversified firms in the Eurozone 
area discounted? Does an optimum level of diversification exist? What are the 
influences of the types of diversification on the firm’s value?  
 
 I.2. Global diversification arguments and perspectives 
 
Firms’ operations into other geographic markets have also received attention 
from researchers. While product diversification strategy is the firm’s expansion into 
new or existing business segments, global diversification confers the firm’s expansion 
into other countries and geographical locations or markets. Hence both diversification 
strategies represent a growth strategy (Chandler, 1962) and global diversification has 
also been widely recognized as an important subject of study. As occurs with product 
diversification, global diversification results are not unanimous since studies do not 
present unique evidence (Annavarjula and Beldona, 2000). On the one hand, since 
global diversification represents a growth strategy (Capar and Kotabe, 2003), scholars 
have found that as firms increase their operations in global markets they regularly 
confront exclusive challenges, such as initial high costs related to the liability of 
foreignness (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). On the other hand, operating in cross-border 
markets allows firms to prevail over the costs related to the liability of foreignness and 
to reap some benefits associated with globalization (Bodnar et al., 1999).  
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First evidence reports a value creation for global firms (Errunza and Senbet, 
1981, 1984; Morck and Yeung, 1991 and Bodnar et al., 1999). Government incentives 
and the capacity to leverage resources across geographic segments are some of the 
causes of this premium. However, researchers also find evidence of destruction of value 
associated with global diversification strategies supporting the discount hypothesis 
(Fatemi, 1984; Geringer et al., 1989; Hitt et al., 1997), arguing that this relationship 
could be attributed to the inexperience of having operations in new geographical 
markets and the complex relations with the new organizational scheme, incrementing 
the agency costs. In this respect, Denis et al. (2002) find that global diversification is 
associated with value destruction compared with single-segment domestic firms.  
 To understand better this strategy better, we must briefly explain the benefits and 
costs of global diversification. Regarding the advantages, market power gives global 
firms the opportunity to increase their revenues and reduce costs over their suppliers, 
distributors and customers (Kogut, 1985). The ability to spread the risk across several 
country-markets helps to reduce fluctuations in revenues (Hennar, 1982). Internalization 
theory explains that firms invest in other international markets in order to exploit 
knowledge capabilities (Williamson, 1975; Hymer, 1976) and to increment learning 
(Hitt et. al., 1997). Being in international markets also gives the opportunity to enjoy 
scale and scope economies (Kogut, 1985; Kim et al., 1993). Global firms can take 
advantage if the environment is not so competitive due to market imperfections 
(Sundaram and Black, 1992) or by differences in taxation across countries (Errunza and 
Senbet, 1981). Also as markets fluctuate managers can shift operations from one 
country to another from less to more beneficial schemes (Thomas and Eden, 2004).  
 In contrast, costs may also arise in global diversification strategies. In line with 
transaction cost theory, the governance costs of firms with cross-borders activities are 
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larger when these firms become more distant from their core business segment2 (Hitt et 
al., 1997). Moreover, the costs of global diversification are typified by the problems of 
the liabilities of newness and foreignness (Hymer, 1976; Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 
2008). For this reason, the management of global firms cannot conduct segment 
business activities as effectively as local firms. As the firm increments its operations, 
the organizational structure becomes more complex to manage, and when this occurs 
shareholders are in a difficult position to monitor the activities of the managers (Jensen 
and Mecking, 1976). Managers are encouraged to pursue different objectives than the 
shareholders interests as long as they can increment their prestige and obtain personal 
benefits (Fatemi, 1984; Michel and Shaked, 1986; Denis et al., 2002), exposing the firm 
to reduce its market value due to the divergence of objectives.   
 
I.3. Determinants of diversification strategies and the impact of 
shareholders’ premiums as dividends 
 
 As with the above arguments and consequences of diversification, it is important 
to explain the most frequent determinants of being involved in multi-segment strategies 
for a better comprehension.     
 
Firms with a great amount of cash and investments have more propensities to 
undertake diversification strategies than firms with lower levels (Hyland and Diltz, 
2002).The debt ratio plays an important role in diversification strategies since it allows 
the assessment of how multi-segment firms employ internal capital markets rather than 
                                                 
2 These governance costs arise because the more distant the operational markets, the more dissimilar the 
firm’s functions. Additionally, information tends to be more asymmetric across segments and borders, so 
managers will have greater difficulties in administrating the firm and, subsequently, transaction and 
coordination costs will increase with the degree of global diversification (Jones and Hill, 1988). 
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access of external finance (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003). The arguments are based 
primarily on the coinsurance effect that gives greater capacity to achieve debt for a 
diversified company than for a non diversified one (Lewellen, 1971), by increasing 
interest tax shields.  
Profitability is associated with firm growth and Hyland and Diltz (2002) 
highlight that firms with low profitability try to improve it by means of diversification. 
As the firm is profitable, it has more capital to invest in product and global business 
units. Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lamont and Polk (2002) contend that firms located 
in low growth industries will seek to diversify into more rapidly growing industries, and 
to test this implication we include Tobin’s q ratio. A firm’s intangible assets are 
fundamentals on diversification strategies. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) explain that 
efforts in intangibles give a firm more potential to explore new business segments due 
to the diversity of knowledge. Finally, size is an important determinant on 
diversification since firms diversify in order to grow (Penrose, 1959; Chandler, 1962), 
and larger firms are more prone to diversify.   
Moreover, diversification decisions and dividend policies are to some extent 
related since they are both dependent on the resources available in the firm (Mackey and 
Barney, 2005). Since payout ratios are mechanisms to reduce the cash flow available to 
the firm, diversification strategies should suffer an important impact in them because 
these strategies are investments used by managers relying on the funds available to the 
firm. Then the extent of diversification strategies will depend on the payout ratios, and 
additionally shareholders’ premiums will be regulated by the extent of firm 
diversification strategies. What is more, if the firm chooses higher levels of 
diversification, agency and transaction costs will start to emerge and firm payout policy 
will alleviate this phenomena. Accordingly, we provide an extensive analysis of the 
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firm’s payout ratios of diversified companies and alternatively the influence of 
diversification strategy in the firm’s payout ratio.  
 
I.4. Institutional factors and country characteristics  
 
 The environment within which firm abilities developed are essential for 
understanding the behaviour of firm diversification strategies. Country settings 
represent different factors, as do institutions and resources that firms have to face, and a 
firm’s performance will differ across geographical areas according to how it fits in to 
different circumstances.  Early studies in international business attempt to provide 
diverse factors that concern the position of markets where the firms must operate, 
whether domestic or global. Researchers on international business strategies, according 
to the resource based and industrial organization theory, have emphasized the 
importance of economic, social, cultural, political and institutional differences across 
countries and establish that markets do matter in the value revenues of firms. 
Wan and Hoskisson (2003) find that, even among institutionally more developed 
countries like the Western European countries, country environmental differences 
(including institutional settings) still have a significant impact on the relationship 
between product and global diversification strategies on firm value. Yip (1991) argues 
that continental businesses in the United States were more profitable than those in 
Europe, and regional businesses in Europe were more profitable than those in the 
United States. 
A growing developing body of literature began with the discovery that the laws 
that protect investors differ significantly across countries, due to some extent to 
differences in the legal origins (see La Porta et al., 1998). Recent literature highlights 
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that cross-country differences in laws, financial systems and development of the capital 
markets affect product diversification, global diversification, and payout policies3.  
Arguments about legal systems are provided by La Porta et al. (1997), who 
explain that there are considerable differences in the levels of investor protection across 
countries with different legal traditions. Based on this premise, they use the legal 
tradition as an exogenous variable to explain the legal protection of investors 
(shareholders and creditors) across countries. Particularly, they separate the legal world 
into four divisions: common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandinavian 
civil law, which can be joined in  two legal traditions: common law (e.g., UK, the US 
and Canada) and civil law (e.g., Continental European Countries and Japan). They 
studied the implications of the differences in the investor protection across countries, 
regardless of their obvious association with a particular corporate governance system. 
They look at the ability of firms in various countries to raise external financing (either 
equity or debt). They find that countries with common law legal origins have the best 
access to equity markets, whereas French legal origin countries have the worst. Relative 
to debt, common law countries provide better access than civil law countries. They 
attribute the inferior development of capital markets in civil countries to the relative 
deficiency of investor protection. The motivation for some arguments is Hayek’s (1960) 
study on the superiority of English to French legal traditions. In Hayek’s analysis the 
spontaneous order represented by the common law is more consistent with individual 
liberty than the more rationalist and constructivist (and, therefore, more interventionist) 
tendencies of the civil law, and the common law is associated with fewer government 
restrictions on economic and other liberties. If common law countries indeed provide 
greater freedom to their citizens, they should experience more rapid economic growth. 
                                                 
3 See for instance, Rajan and Zingales (1998b), Levine (1998, 1999), La Porta et al. (2000), Fauver et al. 
(2003, 2004), Oxelheim and Randøy (2005), Birkinshaw et al. (2006). 
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 An important long-standing issue in corporate finance has been the relative 
merits of banks and financial markets as providers of capital. The specific question is 
whether the orientation of the financial system has any impact on firm value. When 
capital investment or procurements needs are to a greater or lesser extent met directly in 
the relevant markets or stock markets, there is a capital-market oriented financial 
system. In this case, the law of supply and demand is the main regulation factor. On the 
other hand, when banks (financial institutions) deal with the process of capital transfer 
like financial intermediaries, there is a bank-oriented financial system. In general it is 
considered that the predominantly bank-oriented financial system is found in 
continental Europe and Japan and the typical examples of capital-market oriented 
systems are found in the US and the UK.   
Markets and banks offer capital formation, facilitation of risk sharing, 
information production and monitoring. The case for bank-based or market-oriented 
systems could be made based on the relative effectiveness with which banks or markets 
execute these common functions. In the literature, some argue that market-based 
systems are better (Macey, 1998) and others accentuate the of banks (Gilson and Roe, 
1993). Then it seems that adopting the superior financial system would enhance firm 
value. 
Growing theoretical studies examine the great importance of the financial 
system mechanism in relation to the economic increment. Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
study the contractual environment of the country arguing that bank-based systems are 
characterized by low contractibility with deficiencies on the raising of capital to use in 
investments. On the contrary, environments where the raising of capital is easier, thus 
implying growth opportunities, characterize market-based systems. Gerner et al. (1994) 
argue that diversified firms, in order to choose new projects with positive net present 
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
13  
value, are able to exploit their internal capital markets by prevailing over some market 
imperfections, as the resource allocation in this internal capital market is more efficient 
when it is more difficult to get access to external capital. It seems that the agency 
problems are also associated with the success of one system over another (Boot and 
Thakor, 1997), or also the effect of the technological change in the different 
environments associated with determined market oriented system can be more complex 
(Allen and Gale, 1999). 
Economies are different across the globe, and nowadays it is important to 
highlight the performance of firms operating in emerging markets. They are involved in 
great diversification, growth projection and incomparable revenuepossibilities. In the 
middle of the 90s, emerging economies were involved in transitional changes like 
privatizations, more regulation in their currencies and democratic governments.  
In emerging markets it is usual that firms suffer from greater levels of 
asymmetrical information and agency problems and other market imperfections. Lins 
and Servaes (2002) posit that diversified firms may take advantage of the internal 
capital markets or, otherwise, be subject to the expropriation of minority shareholders in 
emerging economies. In this respect, they argue that multi-segment firms in emerging 
economies trade at a discount. Moreover, Lin and Su (2008) find higher valuation for 
diversified firms as compared to single-segment firms in less developed contexts. A 
possible explanation for this value premium is that diversified firms in developing 
countries are able to emulate the strategies of their counterparts in developed countries 
and then exploit their current institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Subsequently, 
Khana and Palepu (2000), in a diversified group firm study, provide evidence that the 
behaviour of these multi-segment firms vary from less developed to developed countries 
due to corporate governance schemes and the level of capital market integration.     
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Claessens et al. (1999) found premiums for diversified companies in less 
developed countries and discount on firms in developed ones. According to this 
reasoning, Fauver et al. (2003) argue that as diversification may have restricted value in 
developed economies, it will be more efficient for firms in countries where the raising 
of external capital is more difficult or in some cases unfeasible to get. Additionally, they 
suggest that diversification may be more valuable in emerging economies than in 
developed ones and negatively related to the level of capital market development, legal 
systems, and international integration.  
We fully understand that multi-segment activities have been broadly studied in 
different fields of knowledge. However, the lack of conclusive evidence on the matter 
has encouraged us to analyse the diversification strategy in greater depth with a stronger 
methodology and a different sample of study. This piece of work is intended to show if 
firms involved in diversification strategies located in different country contexts and 
institutional environments have differences in the premium or discount on their market 
values and in their determinants. Consequently, we attempt to proportionate fresh 
results and evidence for the discussion on the diversification literature for several 
country samples across this study.  
To test all the above arguments of the product and global diversification, we 
propose excess value models because this measure allows us to compare a firm's actual 
value compared to its imputed value if all of its segments operated as a single segment 
firm (Berger and Ofek, 1995) –single domestic for global diversification, respectively-. 
A positive excess value implies that the firm trades at a premium in comparison to 
single-segments companies –single domestic for global, respectively- while negative 
excess values evidence a discount. Moreover, the same pattern is studied for related and 
unrelated diversified firms including the possible alternative of a quadratic relationship. 
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In addition to verifying the determinants of such diversification decision we proceed to 
construct censored models for a better interpretation of the results. In summary, we seek 
to fill in the gaps in the diversification literature by accounting for the financial 
decisions and other control variables on both the causes and effects of diversified firms 
in several countries with current data by taking advantage of he panel data 
methodology.  
 
I.5. Objectives and document structure. 
 
The present document is intended to provide evidence on the importance of the 
diversification strategy on a firm’s value from an international perspective dealing with 
panel data methodology. In this sense, our document is the first, as far as we know, to 
provide an understanding of the impact of product and global diversification on firms, 
and the determinants of the product diversification strategy. Additionally, we include 
the behaviour of the shareholders’ premiums in terms of dividends in different 
institutional settings, focussing on the discount hypothesis characterized by multi-
segment operations.  
 
Our general objective can be split into the three following purposes: 
 
  1. Provide new evidence of the relationship between the product diversification 
strategy and a firm’s value, getting inside the level and types of diversification to 
understand the real benefits and costs that this strategy conveys. To be precise, this 
objective intends to complement the existing literature through the study of this 
relationship, taking into account the related and unrelated diversification from a 
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quadratic relation in institutional environments different to the US (upon which more of 
the empirical studies are based) particularly in the Eurozone area.  
 
2. Expand the evidence of global diversification strategy on firm value by testing 
the moderating effect of the degree of product diversification and institutional contexts, 
more specifically the legal and financial system of the firm’s home countries. In this 
scheme, we intend to discover whether differences in the degree of product 
diversification followed by global firms impact on firm value according to the legal and 
financial home country tradition and consequently observe if the multi-segment activity 
in global markets is a value creating or destroying strategy.  
 
3. Obtain evidence on the relationship between the level of diversification and 
the payout ratios and vice versa by studying the most common determinants of both 
choices. The analysis of this relationship will define the extent of the premium that 
managers provide to shareholders in terms of dividends or if they use the available 
funds within the company to finance diversification strategies. Moreover, we attempt to 
provide empirical results for several countries where controlling its respective effects on 
the legal, financial and level of the economy factors.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to study the impact on firm value because of the 
corporate diversification strategies and in the same way to find out if the resources 
available to a company are used to multi-segment activities or to shareholders’ 
premiums. The former purpose is intended to be realized in international contexts taking 
into account possible institutional differences. 
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As we demarcated clearly in our principal objectives, the present piece of work 
is organized as follows: 
 
In Chapter II, we offer an actual framework on the benefits and costs of the 
diversification strategy and summarize the empirical evidence in this respect. 
Additionally, we formulate our hypothesis and the description of the models and finally 
we explain our results. Chapter III reviews the recent evidence on the implications of 
being a global firm in different environments, the potential advantages and 
disadvantages, and we then pose our main hypothesis and present the models to go 
through our results. In Chapter IV, we discuss the determinants of both product 
diversification and payout ratios that lead us to formulate our hypotheses and propose 
our models. We also provide the results of the estimation of these models. Finally, 
Chapter V presents our main conclusions relating them to the attainment of our 
objectives.  
The present research ends with a presentation of the conclusions that will permit 
us to defend our thesis: “The diversification strategy can be value-creating or value-
destroying depending on the type and level of product diversification and the 
institutional characteristics of the firm’s home country, and it competes with dividends 










DIVERSIFICATION: VALUE-CREATING OR VALUE-
DESTROYING STRATEGY?  
EVIDENCE FROM EUROZONE COUNTRIES 
 
 
 II.1. Introduction 
 
The diversification strategy is a considerable and interesting topic of study in the 
literature of firm valuation, but there is significant disagreement on whether or not 
diversification helps firms to leverage resources and improve their performance, and 
whether or not this strategy creates long-run competitive advantage (Markides and 
Williamson, 1994). Nowadays, there is a debate in the strategic management and 
financial literature about the role played by corporate diversification as a value 
maximization strategy for shareholders. The premise on the decision of being involved 
in expanding into industry segments is simple; basically a firm diversifies when the 
benefits of diversification overcome its costs, and it is supposed to remain focused when 
the opposite occurs (Campa and Kedia, 2002). On the one hand, some theoretical 
arguments point to diversification as a value-increasing strategy for the firm. For 
instance, Fluck and Lynch (1999) argue that diversification permits the financing of 
marginally profitable projects that cannot get financed as stand-alone units. Matsusaka 
(2001) reports that firm’s election to be involved in multi-segment activity is in line to 
efficiencies in organizational schemes. On the other hand, there is also evidence in the 
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literature pointing out that multi-segment firms trade at a discount, in relation to a 
portfolio of single-segment firms, which has led researches to believe that 
diversification destroys value (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Rajan et 
al., 2000; Whited, 2001; Lamont and Polk, 2001, 2002). As such, findings are not 
conclusive; there is an open door to the investigation about the diversification strategy. 
Furthermore, recent research on the effects of different levels of diversification on firm 
value has driven to a curvilinear relation. The curvilinear model posits that some 
diversification is better than none (Palich et al., 2000), but high levels of diversification 
might well be value destroying. 
 The economic literature has focused on the impact of different levels and types 
of diversification on firm value. To examine this impact it is fundamental to distinguish 
between related and unrelated diversification. Firms that follow related diversification 
try to exploit economies of scope through the sharing of physical and human resources 
across similar lines of business segments. In contrast, unrelated diversification pursues 
the search for and achievement of economic advantages by being able to distribute 
capital and other financial resources in an internal market more efficiently (Helfat and 
Eisenhard, 2004). As a result, the evidence regarding which type of diversification is 
better is not unanimous, although diversification into related businesses is frequently 
argued to provide better value and thus should be preferred by the firm (Bettis, 1981; 
Markides and Williamson, 1994), at least in the first stage.  
In this setting, the aim of this chapter is to learn how diversification activity 
impacts on firm valuation, and how this impact is moderated by relatedness in the 
Eurozone countries. Our interest in studying this setting stems from the fact that prior 
literature on diversification is mainly US based (see, for instance, Nayyar, 1992; Rajan 
et al., 2000; Bowen and Wiersema, 2005; 2008). Thus, despite the vast research on the 
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
20  
topic, we provide new evidence on diversification for the Eurozone case which, as far as 
we know, has not been previously documented. To achieve this aim, we estimate an 
excess value model by using the Generalized Method of Moments in a sample of 
Eurozone companies. We provide the following evidence. First, we offer evidence on 
the impact of the diversification strategy on firm value by regressing excess value over 
two different measures of diversification (Total Entropy and Revenue-based in the 
Herfindahl index) and a set of control variables that have traditionally been considered 
as value determinants (i.e. the investment level, debt ratio, profitability, intangible 
assets and firm size). Second, we take into account the possible non-linear relationship 
between the diversification strategy and firm value. Our findings show that there is an 
optimal level of diversification; that is, diversification strategy first creates value and 
then, after a certain breakpoint, destroys value. Third, to investigate how relatedness 
moderates the impact of diversification on firm value, we have interacted diversification 
with a dummy variable that captures the relatedness nature of the diversification. 
Regarding the type of diversification, our main results support that related 
diversification is more value-creating than non-related diversification, and that non-
related diversification is more likely to turn into a value-destroying strategy at lower 
levels than related diversification.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The second Sub-section 
presents the theoretical framework, the hypothesis of our study and the models to test 
them. Sub-section three describes the data and estimation method used in our analysis. 
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II.2. Theory, Hypotheses and Empirical Models 
 
In this subsection, we first summarize the main arguments and contributions of 
previous research to the debate about the benefits and costs of diversification, which are 
the foundation of our hypotheses concerning the effect of diversification on firm value. 
We then specify the models that allow us to test the existence of the premium or 
discount hypotheses. Second, we discuss the arguments behind the diversification 
discount hypothesis to propose additional hypotheses about corporate diversification 
and the value discount.    
 
II.2.1. Corporate Diversification and Firm Value 
 
There are many and somewhat contradictory theoretical arguments in the 
literature to explain the relationship between the diversification strategy and firm 
performance, suggesting that diversification may have both value enhancing and value 
reducing effects. The key question is whether the act of corporate diversification 
destroys value or, on the contrary, it creates value.  
In the past, the industrial organization economics employed years of research 
relying on the conjecture that diversification and performance are linearly and positively 
related (see, for instance, Gort, 1962). This assumption mainly derives from market 
power theory and internal market efficiency arguments (Scherer, 1980; Grant, 1998). In 
the very early stage, the literature on diversification was based on the premise that 
diversified firms are able to make a better use of the market power advantages than 
those single-segments firms can face due the benefits that being multi-segment conveys 
and the ability to increment the market power easily (Scherer, 1980). Additionally, 
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owing to internal market efficiencies, multi-segment firms can benefit from the 
advantage to access without difficulty to external funds to finance growth, and they can 
also transfer capital across businesses within its pertinent segmentation of operations 
(Meyer et al., 1992). As a result, diversification is a source of different efficiencies that 
are difficult to achieve by non diversified firms (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). Overall, 
these arguments indicate that diversification is positively associated with performance. 
To go further on the question as to why a firm diversifies, we should take into 
account the benefits that the diversification strategy conveys. In fact, gains from this 
strategy may come from managerial economies of scale, as proposed by Chandler 
(1977). Additionally, favour the conditions in the extent of an optimal firm expansion 
(Shyam, 2009). Moreover, the increment of the market power is determined by the 
predatory pricing, future higher prices, and cross-subsidization whereby companies use 
the benefits from one product to alleviate the suffering of other damaged line of 
production (Tirole, 1995). Some arguments posit that one of the positive effects of 
diversification is the reduction of the firm’s risk in the way to be involved in more 
businesses in its portfolio (Sobel, 1984; Grant, 1998). This risk reduction is also helpful 
for debt capacity and cost of capital (Lewellen, 1971), this increment on debt exert a 
trade-off effect where diversified firms employ the tax advantages to their benefits 
(Sheifler and Vishny, 1992). For instance, the coinsurance effect confers on multi-
segment firms greater debt capacity than single-line business of similar size (Lewellen, 
1971). One way in which increased debt capacity creates value is by incrementing 
interest tax shields; thus multi-segment firms are expected to have higher leverage and 
lower tax payments than their business if operated separately.  
However, multi-segment firms enjoy of better capital formation, since they can 
obtain easily to external sources as the internally generated assets through their business 
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units. Then, the diversification itself creates internal capital markets that permit more 
efficiently allocation of resources across businesses, and multi-segments firms gain 
considerable financial interests from the use of this internal market and resources 
(Rumelt, 1982). Moreover, in terms of managerial use of resources, Weston (1970) and 
Williamson (1975) argue that managers have in their hands monitoring and information 
advantages over external capital markets. Additionally, a multi-segment firm can exploit 
the advantages of both, internal and external capital markets. Hence, multi-segment 
firms can generate efficiencies that are unavailable to the single-business firm. In short, 
all the above mentioned arguments support diversification as a value-creating strategy.   
There are also many arguments that have led scholars to assume that 
diversification destroys value. A frequent and well accepted argument is the one used by 
agency theory, which points out that managers can pursue their own interests at expense 
of shareholders by means of the diversification strategy (Jensen, 1986). At this respect, 
diversification allows managers to reduce their personal risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981), 
as well as increase their compensation, power and prestige (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
Moreover, managers of divisions that have a future perspective in the firm are 
encouraged to persuade the top management of the firm to conduct resources in their 
direction (Meyer et al., 1992). Jensen (1986) argues that managers of a multi-segment 
firm may be prone to invest any free cash flow to support organizational inefficiencies; 
in other words, they are encouraged to allocate the gains from profitable segments to 
outweigh the losses of non-profitable ones. Control and effort losses (increment of 
shirking) are commonly costs attributable to diversification; since the more complex 
become the segments operations the more difficult to manage the organization of all the 
resources, and consequently the differences of ideas between business appear more 
attenuated (Markides, 1992). The decision to incorporate efficient compensation for 
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multi-segment firms managers produce problems translated into cost for these firms 
because of incentives (Rotenberg and Saloner, 1994). As central management are quite 
far from segments managers depending on the organizational scheme, asymmetries of 
information start to emerge causing in some extent several costs of operating in 
different industries (Harris, et al. 1982). Finally, although diversification translates into 
lower financial risk, it may increase business risk given the different nature and 
characteristics of the businesses to be managed. 
What is unquestionable is that managers of the multi-segment firm enjoy 
greater opportunities to undertake projects and greater resources to do so whenever 
diversification relaxes the constraints imposed by imperfect external capital markets. 
Also during the course of overinvestment in low performing-business, multi-segment 
firms create inefficient internal capital markets (Stulz, 1990); or due to internal power 
efforts that generate influence costs (Meyer et al., 1992; Rajan et al., 2000). This might 
lead them to overinvest resources (Stulz, 1990; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). 
The debate about diversification being a value-creating or a value-destroying 
strategy has given rise to a closely related line of research based on the existence of a 
premium or a discount of the diversification strategy. In this context, the evidence is 
also mixed. For instance, Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) show that, 
controlling for a firm propensity to diversify, there is a diversification premium but 
small. Theoretically, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) show that, diversification may be 
a value creating strategy even if, overall, multi-segment firms have a lower value than 
single-segment firms. More specifically, they show that conglomerates are more 
valuated than small specialized firms, but when those firms are compared with their 
relative large specialized firms a discount emerge. Contrary to these arguments, there is 
also evidence that indicates that multi-segment firms trade at a discount relative to a 
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portfolio of single-segment firms (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lamont, 1997; Shin and 
Stulz, 1998; Scharfstein, 1997; Rajan et al., 2000). Specifically, Berger and Ofek (1995) 
and Shin and Stulz (1998) provide empirical evidence supporting that multi-segment 
firms invest inefficiently and, consequently, trade at a discount in relation to similar 
constructed portfolios of single-segment firms. Particularly, Berger and Ofek (1995) 
explain the value destruction by means of overinvestment and cross-subsidization of 
multi-segment firms. Shin and Stulz (1998) find that divisional resources do not appear 
to be directed to segments with the most favourable investment opportunities. From 
another perspective, Ferris and Sarin (1997) argue that investors prefer focused firms 
since it is more convenient for them to achieve the desired level of risk diversification 
with pure-play firms. Consequently, diversified firms would trade at a discount because 
of lower transparency and lower liquidity. These studies provide empirical evidence on 
the value destroying effect of corporate diversification and, consequently, on the 
existence of a diversification discount.  
Taking all this into account, we propose an analysis of the effect of 
diversification on market valuation, by focusing on the premium or discount that 
diversified firm’s trade at. Consequently, we pose the two following alternative 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Consistent with the diversification premium, diversified firms are 
more valuable than non-diversified firms.  
Hypothesis 1b: Consistent with the diversification discount, diversified firms are 
less valuable than non-diversified firms.  
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To test this hypothesis, we propose the following basic model: 
 
itititititititit SICFIADINVDIVEREV εααααααα +++++++= 6543210        (1) 
    
where EVit, DIVERit, INVit, Dit, IAit, CFit and SIit denote excess value, diversification, 
investment, debt, intangible assets, cash flow and size, respectively4.  The dependent 
variable (EVit) is intended to capture the comparison between the market value of 
diversified firm i and the market value of a portfolio of focused firms operating in a 
similar industry. We follow Berger and Ofek (1995) in computing the excess value as 




where SSi are the sales for segment i, V is the actual firm value, and INDi (V/SS)med is 
the multiple of firm value sales for the median single segment firm in the segment i’s 
industry, and n is the total number of segments for the firm. 
According to the construction of this variable, a positive coefficient of the 
diversification variable would support Hypothesis 1.a. Similarly, Hypothesis 1.b would 
hold under a negative coefficient of the diversification variable. 
 We propose two alternative measures of diversification (DIVERit) that have been 
traditionally used in closely related research. The first one is a measure of Total 
                                                 
4 The subscript i refers to the company and t refers to the time period. εit is the random disturbance. 
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= . The second one is a modified version of the 
















The investment variable (INVit) and the replacement value of total assets are calculated 
as in Miguel and Pindado (2001). The replacement value of total assets is computed, 
( )itititit BFTARFK −+=  where RFit is the replacement value of tangible fixed assets, 
TAit is the book value of total assets, and BFit is the book value of tangible fixed assets. The 
latter two have been obtained from the firm’s balance sheet and the first one has been 
calculated according to the proposals by Perfect and Wiles (1994).  The net fixed assets are 
represented as NFit, and BDit is the book depreciation expense corresponding to year t, then 
we can obtain the value of investment: Iit=NFit-NFit-1+BDit.  The debt ratio (Dit) is defined 
as the market value of long term debt to the market value of equity plus the market 
value of long term debt plus the book value of short term debt. The intangible assets 
variable (IAit) is computed as the firm’s intangible assets scaled by the replacement 
value of total assets. The cash flow variable (CFit) is measured as earnings before 
interests and taxes plus the book depreciation expense plus provisions, scaled by the 
replacement value of total assets. Size (SIit) is measured as the logarithm of the 
replacement value of total assets.                          
 The basic model in (1) controls for other firm characteristics besides 
diversification that have been considered as determinants of excess value in the 
                                                 
6 Si is the share of a firm’s total sales in 4- digit SIC industry i and N is the number of 4-digit SIC 
industries in which the firm operates. Total Entropy equals zero for a single business firm and it rises with 
the extent of diversity (see Jacquemine and Berry, 1979, and Palepu, 1985 for more details). 
7 The Revenue-based in the Herfindahl index (RH), is calculated across n business segments as the sum of 
the squares of each segment i’s sales, (Si), as a proportion of total sales. Thus, the closer RH is to zero, the 
more the firm’s sales are concentrated within a few of its segments (see Berger and Ofek, 1995 for more 
details).  
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literature8. Let us know briefly explain the expected relationships between these 
variables and excess value.  
The investment level is supposed to be higher for the segments of diversified 
companies, because diversification can create internal capital markets, which may 
increase investment efficiency (Stein, 1997). This argument would be supported by a 
positive effect of investment on the excess value of diversified firms. On the contrary, 
agency costs may be a source a potential investment distortions in diversified firms. Top 
management in a diversified firm enjoys greater opportunities to undertake projects, and 
also more resources to do so if diversification relaxes constrains imposed by imperfect 
external capital markets so that overinvestment may arise (Stulz, 1990; Matsusaka and 
Nanda, 2002). This argument would hold if a negative effect of investment on excess 
value is found.   
 Prior research suggests that firm diversification may be financed through 
increased leverage (Kochhar and Hitt, 1998). Thus, we include the debt variable in the 
excess value model because one of the benefits that multi-segment firms enjoy is the 
greater debt capacity as a result of the coinsurance effect. Weston (1970) and Chandler 
(1977) suggest that multi-segment firms have the ability to leverage economies of scale 
because they provide more efficient operations and more profitable lines of business 
than single-segment firms. These arguments and prior empirical results lead us to expect 
a positive effect of leverage on the excess value of diversified firms. 
Previous studies reveal a positive relationship between intangible assets on 
various measures of firm value. This argument is consistent with the notion that the 
market positively assesses a firm’s intangible assets (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan et 
                                                 
8 As usual in the diversification literature, we use the same set of variables as Campa and Kedia (2002) to 
control for other firms’ characteristics that help us understand the performance of multi-segment 
corporations. 
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al., 2001).  Therefore, a positive effect of the variable of intangible assets on excess 
value is expected. 
Servaes (1996) uses a firm’s profitability as a factor to explain the value-
destruction in multi-segment firms. He argues that firms with low profitability are likely 
to trade at a discount as compared to firms with higher levels of profitability. This leads 
us to expect a positive effect of cash flow on a firm’s excess value.  
Finally, most of the empirical studies of firm value use size variable since large 
companies contain different resources to use them in case of adverse environmental 
incontinences (Lee and Makhija, 2009). Moreover, a positive coefficient for size would 
support well-know arguments pointing to size as a value-creating factor via, for 
instance, scale economies and market power, or also that big companies are more prone 
to be diversified.  
 
II.2.2. The Inverted U-Model of Diversification 
 
Based upon the existence of both costs and benefits of diversification, the notion 
of an optimal level of diversification emerges. In fact, the transaction cost theory on 
multi-segment activity suggests that firm’s must commit into bureaucratic costs to get 
economic attributions to increase in product segments (or expand its internalization); 
then, an optimal level of diversification emerges to balance these activities (Jones and 
Hill, 1988).  
 Consistent with the existence of an optimal level of diversification, Markides 
(1992) argues that as a firm becomes more diversified, it gets away from its principal 
business and the benefits of being a multi-segment firm at the margin decreases. As a 
result, Markides (1992) infers that beyond a certain point the marginal benefits from 
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diversification are best explained as a decreasing function. According to this argument, 
Grant et al. (1988) show that profitability increases with product diversity up to a 
certain point, and that it begins to decrease beyond such a point. In the same vein, the 
“Intermediate Model” proposed by Palich et al. (2000) suggests that diversification has 
positive revenues, but the returns fall beyond some point where the optimal level is 
reached. As the markets turn out to be more distant to the firm’s core competences, the 
firm bit by bit losses its ability to leverage and, consequently, its competitive advantage 
and the benefits of the coinsurance effect begin to reduce. 
 According to these arguments about the existence of an optimal level of 
diversification, our second hypothesis predicts an inverted U model to describe the 
relationship between diversification and firm valuation: 
Hypothesis 2: Diversification strategy first creates value and then, after a 
certain breakpoint, destroys value. 
 To test this hypothesis about the quadratic relationship between the 
diversification level and excess value, we extend the basic model in (1) by adding the 
square of the diversification measure: 
 
ititititititititit SICFIADINVDIVERDIVEREV εαααααααα ++++++++= 76543
2
210            (2) 
 
II.2.3. The Effect of Relatedness on Firm Value  
 
Using the resource-based theory arguments we know that economies of scope 
are emerging in firms with diversified activities since the business operations are 
exploited with commonly resources and capabilities easy to transfer across industries 
due the similitude or production excess. Under these circumstances firm’s 
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diversification strategy turns out to be an excellent strategy to allocate resources and 
manage the organization scheme to leverage the firm’s economic activities (Panzar and 
Willing, 1981). In fact, Panzar and Willing (1981) suggest that when the costs of 
producing separate outputs exceed the costs of joint production, firms can achieve 
economies of scope. In contrast, expansion into new business, which is non-related with 
its core business, could be inefficient if the skills and resources used by the firm are 
useless to leverage their existing capabilities (Rumelt, 1974). 
Relatedness might mitigate the value loss from diversification. Related 
diversifiers account for economies of scope as one of the most several advantages (Seth, 
1990) since the more related the business of the segments the most approachable the 
common resources to be exploited. Nayyar (1992) argues that firms that diversify and 
are able to do it in a related industry activity enjoy of greater success when their 
common resources are approachable and the firm use the benefits that being related 
conveys.  For instance, Markides and Williamson (1994) analyze the labours across 
businesses units and obtain evidence of enough efficiency as asset amortization in that 
the firm is able to use economies of scope across business segments that can bring into 
play the same asset. Moreover, Barney (1997) emphasized the potential gains of 
relatedness due to learning curves, easy processes transmission via internal segments, 
and the facility to produce and distribute resources within the diversified firm. 
Additionally, relatedness reduces business risk in that businesses in the portfolio are of 
similar nature and share common characteristics, which make them easier to be 
managed. Lubatkin and O’Neill (1987) posit that related business acquisitions reduce 
the systematic risk despite the markets activities conditions.  
However, unrelated strategies are characterized by business segments when they 
are diversified where no common resources (physical or knowledge) are combined and 
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the advantages are not more than financial (Rumelt, 1974). This financial economies 
gains surge when investments of the firm produce cost cuttings executed through the 
improved allocations of financial resources by taking advantages of the internal capital 
markets and the restructuration of their firm’s specific assets. In fact, even in the 
absence of operational synergies, diversified firms may enjoy other benefits such as tax 
shields, given that interest expenses are tax deductible (Amit and Livnat, 1988). On the 
other hand, there are many ways in which unrelatedness might reduce value. It could be 
that managers have limited expertise and cannot effectively manage diverse businesses, 
or that unrelated segments have conflicting operational styles or corporate cultures. 
These explanations predict that unrelated diversity is negatively correlated with value. 
The evidence from a substantial body of empirical research does not 
conclusively find the related strategy superior to the unrelated one, and it remains an 
unexplained enigma. On the one hand, there are numerous studies that find support for 
the superiority of related over unrelated diversification (Rumelt, 1974, 1982; Bettis, 
1981; Markides and Williamson, 1994). On the other hand, there are many studies 
finding no significant relationship between diversification strategy and performance 
after controlling for relatedness (Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Hill, 1983; 
Montgomery, 1985; Grant et al., 1988; Hill et al., 1992). In a recent study, Lim et al. 
(2009) argue that related and unrelated diversification do not differ systematically in the 
capital structure decisions of the multi-segment companies.  
Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that industry diversification, on average, reduces 
value, and Comment and Jarrell (1995) provide evidence documenting the gains 
achieved by the refocusing firms. However, synergies can potentially arise when a firm 
shares input factors of production across multiple products or lines of business, giving 
rise to the hypothesis that product related diversification generates greater economic 
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value than a single-business focus and unrelated diversification (Rumelt, 1974, 1982; 
Bettis, 1981). That is, relatedness may contribute to mitigate the value loss from 
diversification, as extensive empirical evidence indicates (see, for instance, Lubatkin 
and O´Neill, 1987; Seth, 1990; Nayyar, 1992; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Barney, 
1997). 
These arguments and previous findings lead us to question the role played by 
relatedness in the premium or discount multi-segment firms trade at. In effect, if 
diversification is a value-creating strategy and, consequently, diversified firms trade at a 
premium, the choice of relatedness would translate into a higher market valuation; i.e., 
into a higher excess value. Note that this kind of result would be consistent with 
Hypothesis 1.a. In contrast, consistent with Hypothesis 1.b, diversification will destroy 
value and diversified firms will trade at a discount. Within this context, relatedness 
would mitigate this value destruction and the diversification discount would be lower. 
Relying on these expectations, we pose our last hypothesis about the moderating 
role of relatedness on the relationship between diversification and excess value:  
 
Hypothesis 3: Related diversification affects excess value more positively (or 
less negatively) than unrelated diversification. 
 
 To test Hypothesis 3 and capture the effect of relatedness on firm excess value, 
we extend the model in (2) by interacting diversification measures with a dummy 
variable that allows us to control for related and unrelated diversification. The resultant 
model would be as follows: 
 
ititititititititititit SICFIADINVDIVERUDDIVERUDEV εαααααθαθαα ++++++++++= 76543
2
22110 )()(         (3) 
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where UDit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for unrelated diversification, 
and 0 for related diversification. Relatedness is defined on the basis that industries i and 
j are classified into the same two-digit SIC code. This way, the coefficient of the 
diversification variable (DIVERit) is α1 under relatedness, since UDit takes value zero, 
and it is (α1+ θ1) under unrelatedness, since UDit takes value one. Similarly, the 
coefficient of the square of the diversification variable (DIVER2it) is α2 under 
relatedness, and it is (α2+ θ2) under unrelatedness. In these cases, whenever the dummy 
variable takes value one, the statistical significance of the coefficient must be checked 
by performing a linear restriction test. 
 




To test the hypotheses posed in the previous sub-section, we use data from 
Eurozone countries. We have thus used an international database, Worldscope, as our 
source of information. Moreover, some additional data such as the growth of capital 
goods prices, the rate of interest of short term debt, and the rate of interest of long term 
debt, have been extracted from the Main Economic Indicators published by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
 Our sample comprises data from all Eurozone firms reported on the Worldscope 
data base. For the construction of the diversification indicators we use firms with reported 
industry segment data. Like Berger and Ofek (1995) and Campa and Kedia (2002), we 
exclude firm-years when firms report segments in the financial sector (SIC 6000-6999), 
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firm-years with a missing value of total assets, and firm-years in which the total sales are 
smaller than the sum of their segments by more than one percent. We also eliminate years 
in which the firm did not report four-digit SIC codes for all its segments9.   
 For each country we constructed an unbalanced panel of non-financial 
companies10 whose information was available for a least six consecutive years from 
1990 to 2003. This strong requirement is a necessary condition since we lost one-year 
data in the construction of some variables (the investment variable, for instance), we 
lost another year-data because of the estimation of the model in first differences, and 
four consecutive year information is required in order to test for second-order serial 
correlation, as Arellano and Bond (1991) point out. We need to test for the second-order 
serial correlation because our estimation method, the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) is based on this assumption.   
 Two of the twelve Eurozone countries11 have been excluded from our analysis 
for different reasons. As occurs in La Porta et al. (2000), Luxembourg has been 
removed from our sample because there are just a few firms listed in Luxembourg’s 
stock exchange, and The Netherlands because we have no data enough to the 
construction of some variables in this country. The structure of the samples by number 
of companies and number of observations per country is provided in Table II.1. The 
resultant unbalanced panel comprises 609 companies and 5,004 observations. Using an 
unbalanced panel for a long period (13 years) is the best way to solve the survival bias 
caused because some firms could be delisted and, consequently, be dropped from 
database. Finally, Table II.2 provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) of the variables used in the study. Moreover, in Table II.2, we 
                                                 
9 This restriction is necessary since we are trying to capture the relation between segment business units. 
10 We restrict our analysis to non-financial companies because financial companies have their own 
specificity. 
11 The eurozone currently comprises twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
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use the excess value measure and find preliminary results on value destruction in multi-




























Structure of the Sample by Countries 
 







Germany   185 30.38 1,538 30.74 
France 166 27.26 1,325 26.48 
Italy  54 8.87 467 9.33 
Spain  44 7.22 359 7,17 
Belgium  32 5.25 295 5.90 
Finland  31 5.09 260 5.20 
Ireland  26 4.27 228 4.56 
Austria 27 4.43 222 4.44 
Portugal  22 3.61 160 3.20 
Greece  22 3.61 150 3.00 
Total 609 100.00 5,004 100.00 
Data of companies for which the information is available for at least five consecutive years between 1990 and 2003 were extracted. 
After removing the first-year data, only used to construct several variables, the resultant samples comprise 185 companies (1,538 
observations) for Germany, 166 companies (1,325 observations) for France, 54 companies (467 observations) for the Italy, 44 
companies (359 observations) for Spain, 32 companies (295 observations) for Belgium, 31 companies (260 observations) for 
Finland, 26 companies (228 observations) for Ireland, 27 companies (222 observations) for Austria, 22 companies (160 
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EVit denotes a firm’s excess value, TEit is the Total Entropy index of diversification,  RHit is the Revenue based in the Herfindahl index of diversification, INVit denotes 
investment,  Dit stands for the debt ratio, IAit  denotes the intangible assets, CFit is the cash flow and SIit is the  firm’s size. 
SINGLE-SEGMENT MULTI-SEGMENT TOTAL FIRMS 
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II.3.2. Estimation method  
 
Our models have been estimated by using the panel data methodology on the 
multi-segment sample described in Table II.2. Two issues were considered in making 
this choice. First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, panel data allow us to control for 
individual heterogeneity. This point is crucial in our study because the decision of 
undertaking diversification strategies in a firm is very closely related to the specificity of 
each company. Therefore, to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased results, we have 
controlled for such heterogeneity by modelling it as an individual effect, ηi, which is 
then eliminated by taking first differences of the variables. Consequently, the error term 
in our models, itε , has been split into four components. First, the above mentioned 
individual or firm-specific effect, ηi. Second, dt measures the time-specific effect by the 
corresponding time dummy variables, so that we can control for the effects of 
macroeconomic variables on the diversification decision. Third, since our models are 
estimated using data of several countries, we have also included country dummy 
variables (ci). Finally, vit  is the random disturbance.  
The second issue we can deal with by using the panel data methodology is the 
endogeneity problem. Particularly, the literature concerning the diversification discount 
examines whether such a discount is the result of endogenous choices of the firm. Lang 
and Stulz (1994), for example, find that diversified firms trade at a discount even before 
diversifying. Focusing on firms that diversify through acquisitions, Graham et al. (2002) 
find that the diversification discount can be explained by the lower values of the firms 
that are acquired. Campa and Kedia (2002) suggest that the discount is considerably 
reduced with proper controls for the endogeneity of the diversification decision. 
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 Consequently, to solve the endogeneity problem, our models have been estimated 
by using instruments. To be exact, we have used all the right-hand-side variables in the 
models lagged from t-1to t-4 as instruments for the equations in differences, and t-1 for 
the equations in levels as Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest when derive the system 
estimator used in our analysis. 
 Finally, we have checked for the potential misspecification of the models. First, 
we use the Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions in order to test the absence 
of correlation between the instruments and the error term. Tables II.3 and II.4 show that 
the instruments used are valid. Second, we use the m2 statistic, developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), in order to test for lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-
difference residual. Tables II.3 and II.4 show that there is no a problem of second-order 
serial correlation in our models (see m2). Note that although there is first-order serial 
correlation (see m1), this is caused by the first-difference transformation of the model 
and, consequently, it does not represent a specification problem of the models. Third, 
our results in Tables II.3 and II.4 provide good results for the following three Wald tests: 
z1 is a test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients; z2 is a test of the joint 





In this sub-section we present the analysis results of the diversification effect on 
market valuation by focusing on the premium or discount that diversified firms trade at. 
We first present the results of our basic model, which includes besides diversification a 
set of control variables that have been traditionally used in diversification literature. We 
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then comment on the evidence obtained from the estimation of the value model extended 
by incorporating the square of the diversification variable. This extended model allows 
us to test the existence of potential non-linearities in the relationship between 
diversification and firm excess value. Third, we test the implications of relatedness for 
the effect of diversification on firm excess value.  
 
II.4.1. Diversification and excess value  
 
The results of the GMM estimation of our basic excess value model in (1) are 
provided in Columns I and II of Table II.3 for the total entropy measure (TE) and the 
Revenue-based in the Herfindahl index (RH), respectively. The estimated coefficient of 
diversification is negative using both measures, which supports Hypothesis 1.b about the 
negative effect of a firm’s level of diversification on market valuation. That is, a firm’s 
diversification strategy destroys value, which is consistent with arguments pointing out 
that diversification: i) creates inefficient internal capital markets during the course of 
overinvestment in low performing-business (Stulz, 1990); ii) generates influence costs 
(Rajan et al., 2000); iii) encourages managers to invest free cash flows to support 
organizational inefficiencies (Jensen, 1986); iv) generates control and effort losses, 
coordination costs and other diseconomies related to organization, and discrepancy for 
ideas between businesses (Markides, 1992), among others. That is, consistent with Lang 
and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Ferris and Sarin (1997), Shin and Stulz 
(1998) and Lamont and Polk (2001), multi-segment firms are less valuable than single-
segment firms, which leads diversified firms to trade at a discount. Let us now 
comment on the results obtained for the control variables, which remain identical when 
using the two alternative measures of diversification.   
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Table II.3.  
Estimation results of the Excess Value Model 
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table II.1. The remainder of the variables is defined in Table II.2. The 
rest of the information needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *,** and 
*** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the 
reported coefficients, of the time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; v) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
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The positive coefficient of investment indicates that internal capital markets may 
increase investment efficiency in segments of diversified companies (Stein, 1997). The 
negative coefficient of the debt variable does not corroborate the coinsurance effect 
(Weston, 1970; Chandler, 1977), which suggests that diversified firms benefit from 
greater advantages associated with debt financing and this translates into a higher excess 
value. Consistent with Denis et al. (2002), this result confirms that the costs of debt 
financing (mainly agency and financial distress costs) more than offset its potential 
benefits. Also as expected, a firm’s intangible assets and cash flow positively affect 
excess value, pointing to the positive assessment of the market on both characteristics. 
Finally, size shows a positive coefficient, which supports that size translates into higher 
excess value of diversified firms via economies of scale and market power. 
 
II.4.2. The inverted U-Model  
 
Despite finding evidence on diversification being a value-destroying strategy, 
there is previous evidence that casts doubts on the existence of a linear relationship 
between diversification and value. As we discussed in Sub-section II.2.1.1, according to 
Markides (1992) and the Intermediate Model proposed by Palich et al. (2000), a 
quadratic specification better describes the functional form of this relation12. The results 
of the estimation of the quadratic model in (2) are presented in Columns III and IV of 
Table II.3 for TE and RH measures of diversification, respectively. The coefficient of 
the diversification variable is positive and the coefficient of its square is negative when 
using both alternatives. Moreover, both coefficients are statistically significant, which 
indicates that the relationship between diversification and excess value is quadratic 
                                                 
12 Note that despite obtaining a significant coefficient on the diversification measure for the linear 
specification, we attempt for a non-linear model in order to improve the Wald test on the right-hand-side 
variables and get a better explanation power. 
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rather than linear. Like in Rumelt (1982), who found a pattern of declining profitability 
with the increment of diversity, we find a non-linear relationship between diversification 
and firm valuation. This result corroborates previous evidence provide by, for instance, 
Grant et al. (1988), Markides (1992).  
The finding of a quadratic functional form for the relationship between 
diversification and value implies that there is a breakpoint which can be optimally 
derived by differentiating value in (2) with respect to diversification. Letting this partial 
derivative equal zero, this breakpoint is DIV* =−(α1/2α2). Since α1 and α2 present 
opposite signs, then DIV* is a maximum; that is, an optimal level of diversification. This 
finding strongly supports Hypothesis 2. Specifically, we find that the optimal level of 
diversification is 0.4127 in the model with the Total Entropy measure, which implies 
that, all other things being equal, increases in a firm’s diversification level create value 
until this optimum is reached, and then diversification turns into a value-destroying 
strategy. The optimal level of diversification found in the model with the Revenue-based 
in the Herfindahl index is 0.2583. This result supports the same trend in the relationship. 
Note that the difference between these two optimal levels of diversification stems from 
the differences between the two measures of diversification used: Total Entropy and the 
Revenue-based in the Herfindahl index. The important point is that in both cases the 
tendency of value to first increase and beyond a certain point decrease with 
diversification is supported. In short, our results are consistent with the existence of an 
optimal level of diversification and, consequently, with the inverted U model that stems 
from the Intermediate Model proposed by Palich et al. (2000). Our evidence is also in 
accordance with diversification having both value-enhancing and value-reducing effects 
(Berger and Ofek, 1995). Our results are also in line with the recent finding of Pierce 
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(2009) who posits that firms have limits in expansion that should be recognized through 
diversification strategies.  
 
As can be seen in Columns III and IV of Table II.3, the estimated coefficients of 
the control variables remain identical in sign as in the basic model, thus corroborating 
the above commented relations. 
 
II.4.3. The effect of Relatedness 
 
Finally, we propose a third extension of the excess value model that is intended 
to control for the moderating role of relatedness in the relationship between 
diversification and excess value. With this purpose, we estimated the model in (3) in 
which diversification variables are interacted with a dummy variable that allows us to 
control for related and unrelated diversification. The estimated results of this extended 
model are presented in Columns I and II of Table II.4 for TE and RH measures of 
diversification, respectively. Let us comment on the results obtained for the TE measure 
first. As shown in Column I, the coefficient of related diversification is positive 
(α1= 0.3063) and its square is negative (α2= −0.3093). These results corroborate our 
previous finding of the existence of a quadratic relationship between diversification and 
value, and supporting that an optimal level of diversification exists. The optimally 
derived breakpoint is 0.4951, suggesting that related diversification creates value until 
reaching this level, being value-destroying beyond it.  
We find the same pattern regarding non-related diversification, which totally 
confirms the non-linearity of the relationship between diversity and value. Additionally, 
two interesting results are found. First, the coefficient of non-related diversification is 
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positive (α1+ θ1 = 0.2218, which is statistically significant, see t1 in Table II.4) but 
smaller than the one obtained for related diversification. This result suggests that related 
diversification is more value-creating than non-related diversification supporting 
Hypothesis 3. This evidence is consistent with previous research pointing to the potential 
benefits of relatedness (Reed and Luffman, 1986; Nayyar, 1992). Second, the breakpoint 
derived for the relationship between non-related diversification and value is 0.4139, 
which compared to the one obtained for related diversification (0.4951) suggests that 
non-related diversification turns into a value-destroying strategy at lower levels than 
related diversification. In other words, the value destruction associated with multiple 
segment firms may be counterbalanced with gains that can be achieved by refocusing 
firms (Comment and Jarrell, 1995; John and Ofek, 1995).  
As can be seen in Column II of Table II.4, the results obtained for the model with 
the RH measure of diversification totally confirm the above commented findings.  
All the other variables in the model show significant coefficients, and the same 
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Table II.4.  
Estimation results of the Extended Excess Value Model 
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table II.1. The remainder of the variables is defined in Table II.2. 
The rest of the information needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) 
*,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic for the linear restriction test under the 
null hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the time 
dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, degrees of freedom 
in parentheses; v) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 
the null of no serial correlation; vi) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of 
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II.5. Conclusions  
 
 This chapter provides a test for the effect of the diversification strategy on a 
firm’s valuation taking into account the type and levels of diversification in the multi-
segment firms in the Eurozone countries. To achieve this aim, we first propose a basic 
model in which a firm’s excess value is explained, besides diversification, by a set of 
control variables commonly used in previous diversification research. This model is then 
extended to test the curvilinear relationship between diversification and excess value. 
Finally, we incorporate relatedness into the model to check the effect of this type of 
diversification on firm value as compared to that of unrelatedness.  
 Our results show that the diversification strategy does have an impact on the 
value of firms in Eurozone countries, after controlling for traditional determinants of 
value such as investment, debt, cash flow, intangible assets and size. Our study 
contributes to understanding the implications of the diversification discount by focusing 
on the premium or discount that diversified firms trade at. Preliminary results seem to 
indicate that the diversification strategy leads to a reduction of firm value and that multi-
segment firms are less valuable than single-segment firms. Moreover, a more accurate 
analysis shows evidence of a curvilinear relation between diversification and excess 
value. Hence, there is an optimal level of diversification so that the diversification 
strategy first creates value and then, after a certain breakpoint, destroys value. 
Additionally, our evidence provides empirical support for the idea that related 
diversification is more value-creating than non-related diversification. This result is 
consistent with the potential benefits of relatedness, suggesting that non-related 
diversification turns into a value-destroying strategy at lower levels than related 
diversification. Relatedness thus moderates the discount value of multi-segment firms, 
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when accounting for the moderating effect of the type of diversification in its 




























GLOBAL DIVERSIFICATION AND FIRM VALUE: THE 
EFFECT OF PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION, LEGAL 





The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the effects of product diversification, 
legal systems and financial systems on the relationship between global diversification 
and firm value. While global diversification and its relationship with firm value has been 
a topic of interest in the international business and management literatures (Brock and 
Yaffe, 2008), the results are far from unanimous. On the one hand, operating in new 
geographic areas allows firms to gain the benefits of operating in new markets (Bodnar, 
et al., 1999, Hagendorff et al., 2008). On the other hand, scholars have found that as 
firms increase their operations in global markets they regularly confront challenges such 
as the initial costs related to the ‘liability of foreignness’ (Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). 
In addition to these two opposing views of globalization, recent research has 
increasingly emphasised potentially moderating effects such as the effect of product 
diversification (Geringer et. al., 1989; Hitt et al., 1997; Kim et al., 1989, 1993; Wan and 
Hoskisson, 2003) and the effects of the institutional environment (Thomas, 2005).  
This study contributes to the global diversification literature by being the first to 
analyse comprehensively, via the panel data methodology on a large sample of firms 
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across many countries for the period 1990 to 2003, the separate and joint influence of 
product diversification, legal systems and financial systems on the relationship between 
global diversification and firm value.  
The major results of the investigation are as follows. First, we document the 
impact of the globalization strategy on firm value by regressing excess value on global 
diversification and, find that global firms trade at a discount. Second, we study the 
potential moderating role played by product diversification on such a discount. The 
results show that the level of product diversification exerts a strong influence on the 
market valuation of global firms with higher levels of product diversification being more 
destructive of value. Third, we investigate how global diversification impacts on firm 
value after accounting for the legal environment. The results show that globally 
diversified firms operating in a common law legal environment trade at a premium, 
whereas their civil law counterparts trade at a discount Fourth, we examine the impact of 
the financial environment and we find that global diversification is a value creating 
strategy for firms involved in market-oriented systems but it is a value destroying 
strategy for firms in bank-oriented systems. Finally, we analyze how the premium or 
discount of global firms operating in different legal and financial systems is influenced 
by the degree of product diversification. The results show that lower levels of product 
diversification reduce the discount of global firms in civil law and bank oriented systems 
and increase the premium traded by global firms in common law and market-oriented 
systems.  
The structure of the chapter is organised as follows. The second Sub-section 
develops the underlying hypotheses, while Sub-section three presents the empirical 
models. Sub-section four describes the data and estimation methods and Sub-section five 
presents the results. The last Sub-section offers conclusions. 
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III.2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
III.2.1. Is Global Diversification Good?  
 
Global diversification confers on firms different advantages in that firms 
operating in more than one country are able to exploit certain benefits that domestic 
firms cannot access. In essence, having operations spread among different markets and 
environments permits firms to leverage the positional differences that exist separately in 
each of them.   
Internationalization theory explains the existence of global firms on the basis that 
they are able to benefit from internalizing activities across international markets (Hymer, 
1976). Moreover, operating in multiple locations also offers increased opportunities for 
learning and knowledge acquisition that engenders innovation; in other words, 
experience gained from adapting to global activities translates into better skills and cost 
reduction (Kogut, 1985; Hitt et al., 1997). In fact, since firms use better their resources 
and are more expertise in knowledge the circumstances to be involved in global markets 
are more favourable (Tuppura et al., 2008).   
 Furthermore, global diversification allows firms to enjoy greater economies of 
scale and scope (Kogut, 1985; Grant et al., 1988; Kim et al., 1989, 1993)13. This 
integration of activities across borders permits global firms to make use of product 
standardization, rationalizing production and/or effectively allocating resources (Kobrin, 
1991). The capacity to use these advantages to gain benefits from the correct 
                                                 
13  The multinational firm creates an additional string of options that it can exercise upon occurrence 
of particular outcomes - such as the location to declare profits, the appropriate market to concentrate 
market power and the low-cost location to raise capital. 
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exploitation of the resources acquired14 across global segments might result in higher 
market value (Delios and Beamish, 1999). 
Global diversification also provides firms with the ability to grow when 
prospective market opportunities arise (Buhner, 1987). Associated increments in market 
power allow firms that have operations and sales in more than one country to shift them 
from less-profitable segments to more profitable ones as markets move naturally 
(Thomas and Eden, 2004) – more specifically, increments in market power help to 
diminish costs and enhance income (Kogut, 1985).  In addition, spreading across global 
markets helps to reduce fluctuations in revenue (Kim et al., 1993) and source lower cost 
factor inputs by enabling arbitrage of differences in input and output markets (Hennart, 
1982).  In general, the literature argues that global firms might be able to exploit a 
variety of market conditions via their production networks and the flexibility of their 
cost structures (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). 
Finally, the governance costs of having cross-border business segments under 
common administrative control is likely to be less than the cost of having business 
segments under separate administrative regimes (Caves, 1996) because the experience 
and skills of the central managers are to a large extent reusable in the different 
geographic segments. 
All the above arguments suggest a higher valuation of multinational firms over 
domestic firms, showing that increasing levels of global diversification result in higher 
market value. 
 Contrary to the above arguments, some scholars suggest that global 
diversification does not always create value for the firm (e.g., Zaheer, 1995) because of 
the costs associated with working with cross border business units (Hymer, 1976).  
                                                 
14  These types of resources are known in the literature as “proprietary assets” (see, Hennart, 1982; 
Caves, 1996). 
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Specifically, the costs of global diversification are typified by the problems of the 
liabilities of newness and foreignness (Hymer, 1976;Cheng and Yung, 2008), so that the 
management of global firms cannot conduct segment business activities as effectively as 
local firms. Firms have to face higher or lower liabilities of foreignness depending on 
the structural dimensions of the markets represented by their global diversification, such 
as operating in markets with different cultural values, levels of development or 
institutions, and their skills and experience in managing entry into and operating in 
foreign markets.  Managers in multinationals also have to confront challenges when 
developing and organizing a new business in a different geography because of the need 
to understand the norms of local management and the difficulties of engaging effectively 
in local business networks. These challenges can put a new business unit in a 
‘weakened’ position, as compared to an established firm in the target market, and can 
reduce its competitiveness. These liabilities, however, tend to decrease as a firm’s 
subsidiaries build and improve reputations and legitimacy in the host countries in which 
they operate (Barkema et al., 1996).  
These arguments are added to by transaction cost theory and managerial theory.  
Using transaction cost theory to explain the relationship between global diversification 
and firm value leads us to expect that the governance costs rise as the firm becomes 
more ‘distant’ from its core business segment (Hitt et al., 1997) because the more distant 
the operational markets, the more dissimilar the firm’s functions.  Additionally, 
information tends to be more asymmetric across segments and borders, so managers will 
have greater difficulties in administrating the firm and, subsequently, transaction and 
coordination costs will increase with the degree of global diversification (Jones and Hill, 
1988). 
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In the same vein, managerial theory highlights that global diversification has a 
negative effect on firm value. The difficulties associated with running a global firm 
gives managers more opportunities to pursue their own interests and makes it harder for 
shareholders to monitor management decisions because of complex corporate structures 
(Jensen, 1986). Therefore, the divergence of interests between managers and 
shareholders is likely to reduce the market value of global firms. In addition, global 
diversification will have negative effects on market value because it is more beneficial 
for managers to look for personal prestige than for shareholder value (Denis et al., 
2002). For instance, Denis et al. (2002) use an excess value framework to examine the 
implications of global business operations and find that global diversification is 
associated with an average value discount of 18%. They explain the global 
diversification discount on the basis of the agency perspective. Since more diversified 
firms are less transparent than single domestic firms, diversification makes it harder for 
boards and other internal control systems to prevent managers from taking sub-optimal 
decisions. Doukas and Kan (2006) also use an excess value approach and find that 
global diversification has a negative impact on shareholder value. They attribute the 
result to the reason that the more globally diversified the firm, the more complex its 
operations, the more severe their asymmetric information problems and, consequently, 
the  more pronounced their discount as compared to single segment domestic firms.  
From the discussion above, it should be clear that there is some controversy in 
the literature about global diversification being a value-creating strategy or, on the 
contrary, a value-destroying strategy. Overall, this leads us to pose the following two 
hypotheses about the effect of globalization: 
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Hypothesis 1a: According to internationalization theory and the advantages of 
being in international markets, globally diversified firms trade at a premium. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Because of agency, transaction and coordination costs, globally 
diversified firms trade at a discount.  
 
III.2.2. Do Firms Benefit from Diversifying in Both Business and Global Segments? 
 
Global and product diversification play an important role in a firm’s strategies 
(Hitt et al., 1994). Firms can grow in new product segments and/or by also having new 
business units in other geographic markets and this differentiates between product and 
global diversification. In other words, product diversification works in different 
industries or business segments, whereas global diversification works in different 
countries or global markets (Grant et al., 1988).   
There are arguments supporting the benefits of being diversified in business and 
international segments at the same time.  Product diversified firms may create the 
operational structures, capabilities and abilities in their existing operations so as to 
diminish the transaction costs of cross-border growth, with the knowledge and 
experience obtained from administrating product diversification helping to construct 
capabilities in managing global diversification activities15 (Hitt et al., 1997).  
Furthermore, product diversified firms frequently use specific policies and mechanisms 
to stimulate support or generate strategic competition amongst business units to achieve 
a higher market value (Hill et al., 1992) and obtain superior market values than non 
diversified companies (Lin and Su, 2008). Time spent working in different host product 
                                                 
15 It is important to highlight these mechanisms since global firms present differences in the capabilities 
and resources that they have Huang, et al. (2008).  
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markets gives firm skills, experience and knowledge which it can leverage to reduce 
transaction costs across global markets (Hitt, et al., 1997).   In addition, the market 
opportunities offered by foreign operations provide multi-segment firms economies of 
scale and scope arising from the interdependencies across business units and gives firms 
greater opportunities to achieve synergies from product diversity as they expand into 
global markets (Buhner, 1987). Accordingly, economies of scale and scope may work 
better for multi-segment firms in global markets. Moreover, the sharing of the core 
competences among different business segments and international segments gives 
multinationals the opportunity to benefit overall from the situation (Hamel, 1991). 
On the other hand, there are also arguments that point to the higher costs born by 
globally diversified firms that operate in different business segments. For instance, as 
firms increase their level of global diversification, it may be problematic for top 
managers to evaluate the information provided by business units given their varied 
markets. The asymmetric information problem might also be higher if those global firms 
which are also involved in product diversification strategies; managers in these 
situations will have greater latitude to pursue their own interests given the difficulties of 
precisely defining correct optimisation strategies (Hitt et al., 1992). Another stream of 
literature points to the difficulties of adjusting a business to different external 
environments. Ruigrok and Wagner (2003) argue that diversified firms have their 
specific structures, systems, and internal operations, and that due to this specificity they 
sometimes are not successful in fitting into new competitive environments.  
Prior empirical evidence on the joint effects of product and global diversification 
is also mixed.  For example, Denis et al. (2002) find that the value discount of firms that 
are both industrially and globally diversified is significantly larger than the discount 
associated with being either industrially or globally diversified. This result is supported 
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by Moeller and Schlingemann (2005). In contrast, Hitt et al. (1997) find that product 
diversification enhances the performance of global diversified firms; and Kim et al. 
(1989) find that product diversification is more beneficial in global firms. Similarly, 
Doukas and Lang (2003) argue that the gains of expanding the core business overseas 
are considerably larger in multi-segment firms than in single-segment firms.  
Despite the lack of unanimous evidence, the above arguments and empirical 
evidence agree on the existence of an interaction effect between global and product 
diversification. Accordingly our second hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of global diversification on firm value is moderated by 
the degree of product diversification.  
 
III.2.3. Does the Institutional Environment Matter? 
 
Early studies (Hymer, 1976; Leftwich, 1974) on international business offer 
explanations as to why firms might operate in domestic and global markets. Research on 
international business strategies, according to the resource based and industrial 
organization theories, has emphasized that institutional differences (such as economic, 
social, cultural, legal and political) across countries affect the revenues of global firms. 
Globally diversified firms have to face different institutional factors that contribute to 
the complexity of their operations – for example, government regulations, trade laws and 
currency fluctuations (Sundaram and Black, 1992).  
  Institutional factors may exert a degree of control over global firms. Since 
institutions are considered as regulators of the social environment and cooperation 
among social entities, formal and informal behavioral rules exist (North, 1990). The 
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market value of firms across global markets will, therefore, be dissimilar because 
institutions are developed and sustained through highly localized and path dependent 
processes in any given country (Makino et al., 2004). Hence, since the stability and 
efficiency of the particular institutions define the costs of working in different markets, 
then firm value will vary according to the specific country (North, 1990; Henisz, 2000). 
Organizational evolution theory explains that as firms grow, differences in 
institutional conditions create managerial difficulties that might be represented as new 
managerial inconveniences (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982). In short, the firm which 
expands globally has to align its operations with changing conditions in different 
markets across the globe.  The ease with which it achieves this alignment will, of course, 
affect its market value (Ruigrok and Wagner, 2003).  For example, Wan and Hoskisson 
(2003) found that even among institutionally more developed countries, such as those in 
Western Europe, environmental differences, including institutional factors, still have a 
significant impact on the relationships between product and global diversification 
strategies and firm value.  
 
III.2.3.1. Legal systems.  
 
Although the linkages between legal and market systems have been explored 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002; Stulz, 1999) the 
literature on the legal dimensions of globalization is relatively scarce (Oxelheim and 
Randøy, 2005; Birkinshaw et al., 2006).  
The motivation for some of the arguments is Hayek’s (1960) study on the 
superiority of English to French legal traditions. In Hayek’s analysis the spontaneous 
order represented by the common law is more consistent with individual liberty than the 
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more rationalist and constructivist (and, therefore, more interventionist) tendencies of 
the civil law. The common law is associated with fewer government restrictions on 
economic and other liberties. If common law countries indeed provide greater freedom 
to their citizens, they should experience more rapid economic growth.  
Arguments about legal systems are provided by La Porta et al. (1997) who 
explain that there are considerable differences between the levels of investor protection 
in countries with different legal traditions. With this aim, they use the legal tradition as 
an exogenous variable to explain the differences in the legal protection for investors 
(shareholders and creditors) across countries. In their research they separate the legal 
world into two legal traditions: common law (e.g., the UK, the US, Canada and Ireland) 
and civil law (e.g., Continental European Countries and Japan). They studied the 
implications of the differences of investor protection across countries, regardless of their 
obvious association with particular modes of corporate governance, and found the 
raising of external finance easier in common law countries than civil law countries. 
More specifically, they found that countries with common law legal origins have the best 
access to equity markets, whereas French legal origin countries have the worst. They 
attribute the inferior development of capital markets in civil countries to the relative 
deficiency of investor protection.  
In the field of global diversification research there is little empirical research on 
the impact of the legal system on diversification strategies. For example, Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) attempt to study whether global diversification varies across 
different institutional environments but find no support. Ferris et al. (2007) find a 
reduction in the discount for industrially and globally diversified firms and better excess 
values in civil law countries. In this vein, Fauver et al. (2003) find that the discount of 
diversified firms is less pronounced in countries where the legal system is civil law in 
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origin. They also find that product diversified firms operating in countries with English 
legal system origins trade at a substantial discount. In a subsequent study about global 
diversification, Fauver et al. (2004) find that the market value of U.S. global firms is 
discounted, while this is not the case for UK and German global firms. The argument 
behind these results relies on the fact that the benefits of global diversification (in terms 
of internal markets) are more valuable for firms in civil law countries where it is more 
difficult to raise of external finance.  
Overall, there is not a definitive answer to the question as to how the legal 
system influences the relationship between market value and global diversification. On 
the one hand, a better valuation of global firms in common law environments may be 
due to the easier access to debt and equity markets, or to stronger investor protection. On 
the other hand, a superior market valuation for global firms in civil law countries may be 
explained by their ability to better exploit the characteristics of internal markets created 
during globally diversification.  Accordingly, the reported evidence leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of global diversification on firm value depends on the 
legal tradition (common versus civil) of the home country. 
. 
III.2.3.2. Financial systems. 
 
An important long-standing issue in corporate finance has been the relative 
benefits of banks and financial markets as providers of capital. The key question is 
whether the orientation of a country’s financial system (bank or market-based) has any 
impact on firm value, and if this impact is important for global firms.  In general, it is 
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considered that bank-oriented financial systems are predominantly found in continental 
Europe and Japan, and the typical examples of capital-market oriented systems are the 
US and UK.   
It is widely recognized that markets as well as banks are important for the firm’s 
goals consecutions due that these systems perform crucial functions in the economy as: 
i) to provide a better risk sharing, ii) exert a monitoring effect, iii) facilitation in capital 
formation, and iv) information advantages on the production. Banks and markets have 
been explained from diverse backgrounds. Comments are selected from the notion that 
the orientation of the financial system has no real implications to arguments on the 
superiority of the one system over another. A mediated opinion is the one positing that 
the effectiveness of a particular financial system depends on the operational environment 
in a country, which may include the contractual setting (Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
Bank-based systems on their own fit situations with low contractibility combined with 
high capital scarcity relative to investment opportunity. Market based systems offer 
better yields in environments characterized by high contractibility and high capital 
availability relative to investment opportunities (entailing growth opportunities).  
An increasing number of theoretical studies examine the importance of the 
financial system mechanism to economic growth16. The predominance of one system 
over the other could be based on the relative effectiveness with which banks or markets 
execute the above mentioned functions. In the literature, some authors argue that market-
based systems are intrinsically superior (Macey, 1998), and others stress the vital 
function of banks systems (Gilson and Roe, 1993).  It seems that agency problems are 
also associated with the success of one system over another; more specifically, firms in 
industries with consistent state verification make use of the financial markets, and firms 
                                                 
16  Levine and Zervos (1998), and Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) explore the impact of 
financial development on economic growth at country, industry and firm levels. 
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that require high levels of monitoring tend to be in bank systems (Boot and Thakor, 
1997). The effect of the technological change in the different environments is somewhat 
more complex (Allen and Gale 1999). 
Evidence on the impact of capital market development on firm value is found in 
Fauver et al. (2003). They investigate the development of capital markets across several 
countries and its effect on multi-segment firm value, and find that the discount of 
diversified firms is less pronounced in countries where capital markets are less 
developed, while it is higher in countries with well established capital markets and better 
structural conditions. They argue that diversified firms obtain benefits from internal 
capital markets especially in countries with costly and less developed external capital 
markets.  Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) and Levine (1998, 1999) find that 
markets develop better in countries where the rights of the minority shareholders are 
well protected (e.g., common law countries) and they argue for the superiority of 
markets in common law countries. Similarly, Levine (1999) finds that banks develop 
better in countries where the rights of the secured creditors are well protected17.   
 Hence, we expect global diversification strategies to perform better in countries 
with market-based systems and propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of global diversification on firm value depends on the 




                                                 
17  Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) provide evidence of relations between the legal environment 
and financial systems. 
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III.2.3.3. The impact of product diversification on global firms involved in different 
legal and financial systems.  
 
Previous sub-sections provide arguments about the key factors that may 
influence the valuation of global firms and the final hypothesis to be tested here involves 
the interaction between the factors.  More specifically, we consider the joint effect of 
both product and global diversification strategies given the legal and financial systems of 
the country in which the firm has its core business. Therefore, our last hypothesis is as 
follows: 
  
Hypothesis 5: The impact of product diversification on a global firm’s value 
depends on the legal tradition and the orientation of the financial system of the 
country in which the firm has its core operations.   
 
III.3 Empirical models 
 
To analyze the relationship between global diversification and the market value 
of firms, we follow the excess value approach used by Berger and Ofek (1995), Denis, et 
al. (2002) and Doukas and Kan (2006).  Consequently, the general specification of our 
model is as follows: 
 
itititititititit SIINTCFDEBTINVGDEV εααααααα +++++++= 6543210         (1) 
 
 The dependent variable, EVit, is the excess value and it is intended to capture 
the comparison between the market value of globally diversified firm i and the market 
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value of a portfolio of focused firms operating in a similar industry18,19. In Table III.1 all 
the variables used in our models have been specified.    
 The key explanatory variable, GDit, is a variable that accounts for the level of 
global diversification as measured by the Global Entropy20 index (GE), that considers 
both the number of geographic segments in which a firm operates and the relative 
importance in sales contributed by each geographic segment.  We have performed a 
robustness check by constructing two alternative measures for global diversification. 
The first one is the Global Herfindahl21 index (GH). The second one is the ratio of 
Foreign Sales to Total Sales (FSTS), used as an indicator of the intensity of global 
diversification in previous studies (see, for instance, Geringer et al., 1989; Sullivan, 
1994;   Denis  et al.,  2002;   Fauver et al., 2004;   Doukas and Kan, 2006). Given the 
construction of the excess value variable, a positive coefficient for the diversification 
variable would support Hypothesis 1.a, while a negative coefficient would offer support 
to hypothesis 1.b.  
The control variables employed in this analysis have been commonly used in the 
global diversification literature.  To capture that global diversification is likely to be part 
of a more general growth strategy, we incorporate the investment variable (INVit).  A 
firm’s debt ratio has been argued to affect firm value (Buhner, 1987; Hitt and Smart, 
1994) because on the one hand, high-leveraged firms are expected to be less valuable 
due to high debt levels preventing a firm from raising funds to finance value creating 
projects (Lang et al., 1996).  Contrary arguments point out that, corporate debt can act as 
                                                 
18  See Table 1 for the exact definition/measure of all the variables used in the paper. 
19  See Berger and Ofek (1995), Denis, et al., (2002), and Doukas and Kan (2006) for further details 
in the construction of this measure. 
20  Previous studies which have used this measure are Kim et al. (1989), Hitt et al. (1997) and 
Delios et al. (2008).  
21  The Global Herfindahl index is computed as the sum of the squares of each geographic 
segment’s sales as a proportion of total sales. This index becomes 0 if the firm is only present in one 
global market, and the index becomes closer to 1 as the firm becomes more globally diversified (See Amit 
and Livnat, 1988). 
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a monitoring mechanism of managerial behaviour and value is thus enhanced (Jensen, 
1986). Moreover, Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) find empirical results for globally firms 
suggesting that debt ratios differ systematically from those of domestic companies.  
Consequently, we include corporate debt (DEBTit) in the model. Prior research indicates 
that the relationship between firm value and global diversification might rely on the 
ability of firms to cover the costs of doing business globally (Geringer et al., 1989); we, 
therefore, include a firm’s cash flow (CFit). Companies with higher intangible assets 
may achieve higher returns by innovating in product design in the global markets and 
lower production costs by improving manufacturing processes (Hitt et al., 1997; Kotabe 
et al., 2002). Moreover, to operate abroad offer firms the opportunity of perform process 
of innovation in other countries (Tsang et al., 2008). Accordingly we incorporate the 
intangible assets variable (INTit). Finally, global diversification has been associated with 
firm size. Tallman and Li (1996) argue that large firms access more easily the resources 
needed to operate successfully in foreign markets. Hence we control for firm size (SIit) 
by including the logarithm of the replacement value of total assets. All explanatory 









                                                 
22  The replacement value is measured following the procedure of Miguel and Pindado (2001). See 
Table III.1. 
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NAME MEASURE DATA SOURCE 
EVit Excess 
Value 
The natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s total market value to its 
imputed value.  The Imputed Value is the sum of the imputed stand alone 




where SSi are the sales for segment i, V is the actual firm value, and INDi 
(V/SS)med is the multiple of firm value sales for the median single segment 
firm in the segment i’s industry, and n is the total number of segments for the 
firm. 
The imputed value is constructed following the procedures of Doukas and 
Kan (2006); and similar to Denis et al. (2002) and Bodnar et al. (1999), it is 
derived by multiplying the segment sales with the median sales multiplier 
(ratio of total capital to sales) of the entire sample of domestic single-segment 
firms in the same industry and in the same year. The industry median ratios 
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= , where Si is the share of a firm’s total sales in 4- digit 
SIC industry i and N is the number of 4-digit SIC industries in which the firm 
operates. Total Entropy equals zero for a single business firm and it rises with 
the extent of diversity 
Worldscope 
RHit Revenue 

















SiSiRH is calculated across n business segments as the 
sum of the squares of each segment i’s sales, (Si), as a proportion of total 
sales. Thus, the closer RH is to zero, the more the firm’s sales are 
concentrated within a few of its segments 
Worldscope 
INVit Investment Iit=NFit-NFit-1+BDit, . where NFit, represents the net fixed assets and BDit is the 
book depreciation expense corresponding to year t, scaled by the replacement 
value of assets 
Worldscope and 
OECD indicators 
Dit Debt The market value of long term debt to the market value of equity plus the 
market value of long term debt plus the book value of short term debt 
Worldscope and 
OECD indicators 
CFit Profitability Firm’s cash flow as measured by earnings before interests and taxes plus the 
















Dummy variable, 1 is applied if is a common law country is involved and 0 if 
it is a civil law country 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
FSit Financial 
System 
Dummy variable, value 1 is applied if country is involved in a market-
oriented system and 0 if it is classified as being bank-oriented 




Kit  Replacement 
Value 
( )itititit BFTARFK −+=  where RFit is the replacement value of tangible fixed 
assets, TAit is the book value of total assets, and BFit is the book value of tangible 
fixed assets. The latter two have been obtained from the firm’s balance sheet and 
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To investigate whether the degree of product diversification moderates the 
relationship between firm value and global diversification, we extend the basic model in 
(1) by including the interaction of a dummy variable, PDit,  (that takes the value of 1 for 
firms with a high degree of product diversification and 0 firms with a low degree of 
product diversification23) with GDit. The resultant model is as follows:  
 
ititititititititit SIINTCFDEBTINVGDPDEV εαααααλαα ++++++++= 65432110 )(       (2) 
 
With this formulation, the coefficient of the global diversification variable (GDit) 
is α1 for globally diversified firms with a low degree of product diversification (since 
PDit takes the value 0), and it is (α1+ λ1) for global firms operating with high levels of 
product diversification (since PDit takes the value 1). 
We also investigate whether the characteristics of legal and financial systems 
moderate the relationship between firm excess value and global diversification by 
estimating the following model:  
 
ititititititititit SIINTCFDEBTINVGDLSEV εαααααγαα ++++++++= 76543110 )(   (3) 
 
where LSit is a dummy variable constructed to capture the nature of legal system, where 
the value 1 is applied for firms operating in a common law country and 0 for firms 
operating in a civil law country. We follow La Porta et al. (1998) in the construction of 
                                                 
23  For the construction of this variable we build a Total Entropy measure following Jacquemine and 
Berry (1979) and Palepu (1985). We also build a Revenue-based Herfindahl index as in Berger and Ofek 
(1995). These measures permit us to control for the extent of product diversification strategies on the firm. 
According to its construction, DIVit takes the value of 1 if the index of Total Entropy or Revenue Based 
Herfindahl index is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise. 
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this index. We then replace LSit for FSit to account for the moderating role played by the 
financial system. The construction of the index of financial systems is based on Beck et 
al. (2001) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002). Hence LSit takes a value 1 for 
firms involved in market-oriented system and a value of 0 for firms involved in a bank-
oriented system24. Using this approach, the coefficient of the global diversification 
variable (GDit) is α1 for globally diversified firms operating in civil law countries or in 
bank-oriented financial systems (since LSit and FSit  take value 0, respectively); and it is 
(α1+ γ1) for global firms involved in common law countries or in market-oriented 
financial systems (since LSit and FSit  takes value 1, respectively).  
Finally, we investigate whether the joint effect of global and product 
diversification on excess value is moderated by the legal and financial systems and we 
estimate the following model:  
 
itititititititititit SIINTCFDEBTINVGDLSPDEV εαααααγλαα +++++++++= 765431110 )(    (4) 
 
 In this respect, the coefficient of GDit for globally diversified firms operating in 
civil law countries or in bank-oriented systems is α1 if the firm’s level of product 
diversification is low (since PDit , LSit and FSit take the value 0); and it is (α1+ λ1) if the 
firm’s level of product diversification is high (since PDit takes value 1 and LSit and FSit 
take the value 0). Similarly, the coefficient of GDit for global firms operating in common 
law countries or market-oriented systems is (α1+ γ1) when the firm’s level of product 
diversification is low (since PDit takes value 0 and LSit and FSit take value 1); and it is 
                                                 
24  The exact calculation of the index is based on the ratio of banking sector development and stock 
market development of each country, so with these two measures they classify with respect to their median 
value, then values above the median are considered as countries with market-based systems and bank-
based below the median of both indexes.  
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(α1+ λ1 + γ1 ) when the firm’s level of product diversification is high (since PDit, LSit and 
FSit take value 1)25. 
 
III.4. Sample, data, variables and estimation method 
 
To test the hypotheses posed in the previous sub-section we use data from 
Eurozone countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. These 
countries represent a great diversity of institutional environments.  The selection of 
sample countries is motivated by the existence of distinct financial and institutional 
settings prevailing all over the world. For each country we construct an unbalanced panel 
of non-financial companies from 1990 to 2003. Three of the sixteen countries26 have 
been excluded from our analysis for different reasons. As occurs in La Porta et al. 
(2000), Luxembourg has been removed from our sample because there are just a few 
firms listed in Luxembourg’s stock exchange. The Netherlands and Italy have also been 
omitted because we do not have sufficient data to construct a number of the variables. 
The structure of the samples by number of companies and number of observations per 
country is provided in Table III.2. As shown in Table III.2, the resultant unbalanced 
panel comprises 1744 companies and 8965 observations. Using an unbalanced panel for 
a long period (13 years) is the best way to resolve the issue of survival bias because 
some firms will be delisted and, consequently, dropped from the database.      
 
 
                                                 
25  It is worth noting that in all cases whenever the dummy variable (PDit, LSit or FSit) equals one, 
the statistical significance of the coefficient must be checked by performing a linear restriction test. The 
null hypotheses to be tested in these cases are the hypothesis of no significance, H0: α1 + λ1=0, 
H0: α1+ γ1=0 and H0: α1+ λ1 + γ1=0. 
26  The Eurozone currently comprises twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table III.2.  
Structure of the Sample by Countries. 
 







Germany 215 12.33 1536 17.13 
France 193 11.07 1390 15.50 
Spain 52 2.98 374 4.17 
Finland 41 2.35 274 3.06 
Greece 48 2.75 241 2.69 
Belgium 32 1.83 245 2.73 
Portugal 31 1.78 204 2.28 
Ireland 28 1.61 214 2.39 
Austria 25 1.43 171 1.91 
US 442 25.34 1768 19.72 
UK 167 9.58 668 7.45 
Canada 53 3.04 212 2.36 
Japan 417 23.91 1668 18.61 
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We use Worldscope as the principal source of data, with variables such as the 
growth of capital goods’ prices, the rate of interest of short term debt and the rate of interest 
of long term debt being extracted from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Main Economic Indicators.  For the construction of the global 
and product diversification indicators we use firms with reported industry and geographic 
segment data.  Following Berger and Ofek (1995), Campa and Kedia (2002) and Denis et 
al. (2002) we exclude firm-year observations with a missing value of total assets,   
observations of financial companies (SIC 6000-6999) and firm-year observations with 
reported sales in either product or global segments higher than  the total sales reported . 
Finally, following Berger and Ofek (1995), Fauver et al. (2003) and Doukas and Kan 
(2006) we eliminate excess values higher or lower than four times the imputed value 
from the benchmark firms. Table III.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in this study and previously defined in Table III.1.  
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Table III.3. 
Summary Statistics, Mean and Median Values for Different Samples 
EVit denotes a firm’s excess value, GEit is the Total Entropy index of Global Diversification ,  GHit is the 
Revenue based in the Herfindahl index of Global Diversification, FSTSit is the ratio of Foreign Sales to 
Total Sales, TEit is the Total Entropy of product diversification index, RHit is the Revenue-Based 
Herfindahl index of product diversification, INVit denotes investment,  Dit stands for the debt ratio, CFit is 













(n=  4721) 
 
Domestic firms 
(n=  4244) 
 
 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median Mean  Median  
PANEL A    
• EVit -0.11 -0.00 -0.16 -0.20 -0.06 0.00
PANEL B 
Global diversification 
   
• GEit 0.44 0.23 0.83 0.81 0.00 0.00
• GHit 0.24 0.10 0.46 0.49 0.00 0.00
• FSTSit 0.22 0.04 0.40 0.37 0.01 0.00
Product diversification   
• TEit 0.70 0.69 0.89 0.89 0.49 0.46
• RHit 0.36 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.28 0.26
PANEL C 
Firms characteristics  
   
• INVit 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
• Dit 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.06
• CFit 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
• IAit 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.01
• SIit 13.19 13.09 13.83 13.72 12.48 12.41
 
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
74  
Our models have been estimated by using the panel data methodology on the 
sample described in Table III.1. Two issues have been considered in making this choice. 
First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, panel data allow us to control for individual 
heterogeneity and to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased results because of such 
heterogeneity (Moulton, 1986, 1987). This point is crucial in our study because the 
decision of undertaking global diversification strategies in a firm is very closely related 
to the specificity of each company. Therefore, to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased 
results, we have controlled for such heterogeneity by modelling it as an individual effect, 
ηi, which is then eliminated by taking first differences of the variables. Consequently, the 
error term in our models, itε , has been split into four components.  First, the above 
mentioned individual or firm-specific effect, ηI; second, dt measures the time-specific 
effect by the corresponding time dummy variables, so that we can control for the effects 
of macroeconomic variables on the global diversification decision; third, since our 
models are estimated using data from several countries, we have also included country 
dummy variables (ci) and finally, vit  is the random disturbance.  
The second issue we can deal with by using the panel data methodology is the 
endogeneity problem. Particularly, the literature concerning the diversification discount 
examines whether such a discount is the result of endogenous choices of the firm. Lang 
and Stulz (1994), for example, find that diversified firms trade at a discount even before 
diversifying. Focusing on firms that diversify through acquisitions, Graham et al. (2002) 
find that the diversification discount can be explained by the lower values of the firms 
that are acquired. Campa and Kedia (2002) suggest that the discount is considerably 
reduced with proper controls for the endogeneity of the diversification decision. As a 
consequence, endogeneity may be a problem in our models that needs to be controlled 
for. That is why our models have been estimated by using instruments. To be exact, we 
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
75  
have used all the right-hand-side variables in the models lagged from t-2 to t-6 as 
instruments for the equations in differences, and t-1 for the equations in levels as 
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest when they derive the system estimator used in this 
study. 
 Finally, we have checked for the potential misspecification of the models. First, 
we use the Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions in order to test the absence 
of correlation between the instruments and the error term. Second, we use the m2 
statistic, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), to test for a lack of second-order serial 
correlation in the first-difference residual. Tables III.4, III.6 and III.7 shows that there is 
not a problem of second-order serial correlation in our models (see m2)27.   Third, the 
results presented in Tables III.4, III.6 and III.7 provide significant results for the 
following three Wald tests: z1 is a test of the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients; z2 is a test of the joint significance of the time dummies; and z3 is a test of 
the joint significance of the country dummies. 
 
 III.5. RESULTS 
 
 We present descriptive statistics in Sub-section III.5.1 and the results of our basic 
model are commented on in Sub-section III.5.2. We then study in Sub-section III.5.3 the 
implications of product diversification for firms involved with global diversification 
strategies. In Sub-section III.5.4 we analyse the impact of legal and financial systems on 
the relationship between global diversification and excess value. Finally, in Sub-section 
                                                 
27 Note that although there is first-order serial correlation (see m1), this is caused by the first-difference 
transformation of the model and, consequently, it does not represent a specification problem of the 
models. 
 
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
76  
III.5.5 we investigate the interaction effect of institutional factors and product 
diversification on the relationship between global diversification and excess value.   
 
III.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table III.3 provides summary statistics (mean, median) of the variables used in 
our analysis. As can be seen in Panel A, the mean value of the excess value measure is 
negative and larger in absolute value for global firms than for domestic firms. This 
behaviour points out that the costs of being global goes beyond the benefits discussed in 
Sub-section III.2.1.  In Panel B we report three different indices to capture global 
diversification (Global Entropy, Global Herfindahl and Ratio of Foreign Sales to Total 
Sales), and two measures for product diversification (Total Entropy, and Revenue Based 
in Herfindahl Index).  Both the mean values of global diversification (0.83) and product 
diversification (0.89) are higher in the sub-sample of global firms as compared to 
domestic firms (0.00 and 0.49, respectively) which suggests that product diversification 
is a widespread strategy in global firms probably because they want to achieve the 
advantages of being involved in both strategies. Panel C reports statistics of the firms’ 
characteristics commonly used to explain the value implications of being global.  
 
III.5.2. Results of the Basic Excess Value Model 
 
The results of the GMM estimation of our basic model in equation 1 are provided 
in Column I of Table III.4.  The negative coefficient for the global diversification 
variable (GDit= -0.122) suggests that having operations in global markets destroys value. 
This evidence supports the results reported by Denis et al. (2002) and it is also consistent 
with the arguments of Hymer (1976) about the trade-off cost suffered when working on 
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global segment business, Hitt et al. (1997) about the transaction cost theory of 
governance costs, and Berger and Ofek (1995) and Shin and Kim (2002) on the 
inefficient investment of multi-segment firms. Accordingly, global diversification is 
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Table III.4. 
Estimation Results for Excess Value and Global Diversification and the Interaction 
with Product Diversification Model. 
 
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table III.1. The variables are defined in 
Table III.2. PDit is a dummy variable that takes the following values: a) 1 for the companies with high 
degree of product diversification strategies and 0 for the companies with low degree of product 
diversification, this index was constructed using the Total Entropy measure of product diversification. 
The rest of the information needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic 
standard error in parentheses. ii) *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively; iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the 
time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null 
of no significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using 
residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
  
In terms of the results for the control variables, we find evidence that excess 
value is positively and significantly associated with investment, profitability, intangible 
assets and firm size. Similar results are found by Berger and Ofek, (1995), Campa and 









































z3 3.03(8) 6.26 
(8) 
m1 -14.95 -15.06 
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Kedia (2002), Denis et al. (2002) and Fauver et al. (2003).  As in Denis et al.  (2002) the 
debt variable has a negative coefficient, which suggests that the cost of debt financing 
(mainly agency costs) more than offsets its potential benefits (particularly aligning the 
interests of owners and managers and signalling to the market).  
These results remain identical when we estimate the model using the two 
alternative measures of global diversification28. In summary, the results of this 
subsection confirm Hypothesis 1.b for the destruction of value associated with global 
diversification, after controlling for other firm characteristics (investment, debt, 
profitability, intangible assets and firm size) that are important in explaining the value of 
firms operating in foreign markets. 
 
III.5.3. The Impact of Product Diversification on the Relationship between Global 
Diversification and Excess Value 
 
Table III.5 presents a preliminary analysis of the differences in the value of 
global firms depending on their levels of product diversification.  
 We check the differences in mean excess values of global firms between firms 
with high levels of product diversification and firms with low levels of product 
diversification. As shown in Panel A, these differences are statistically significant (see t 
values) and, more importantly, the excess value measure is negative for both sub-
samples but it is greater for firms with high levels of product diversification. 
 Panel B reports the mean values of the global diversification variables. 
Confirming the results in Sub-section III.5.1, higher levels of global diversification are 
found in firms with a high degree of product diversification.   
                                                 
28To save space these results have not been reported in the paper. They are available upon request from the 
author. 
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Table III.5.  
Differences between Low and High Degree of Product Diversified Firms 
PANEL A. Excess Value 
 
Degree of Product 
Diversification 
Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Low 3880 -0.03 (0.51) 




PANEL B. Global Diversification 
(Global Entropy) 
 
Degree of Product 
Diversification 
Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Low 3880 0.24 (0.39) 
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Table III.4 reports the results on the impact of product diversification on the 
relationship between excess value and global diversification.  As shown in Column II of 
Table III.4, the negative impact of global diversification on excess value is larger for 
firms with a high degree of product diversification [(-0.0732) + (-0.0780) = -0.1512, 
which is significantly different from zero, see the t statistic] than for globally diversified 
firms with a low degree of product diversification (-0.0732).  In essence, the difficulties 
globally diversified firms face in terms of coordination, information asymmetry, and the 
misalignment of ideas between managers and shareholders seem to be accentuated when 
the firm simultaneously opts for a strategy of product diversification. 
We, therefore, find support for Hypothesis 2 about the moderating role played by 
the level of product diversification on the effect and value implications of global 
diversification. Specifically, we find that global firms with high levels of product 
diversification are more value-discounted than those with low levels of product 
diversification. This result is in agreement with Harris et al. (1982) and Denis et al. 
(2002), who argue that the costs of coordination difficulties, information asymmetry and 
lack of understanding between headquarters and divisional managers translates into 
value destruction for globally diversified firms. More importantly, when companies 
over-operate jointly in product and global segments, their market value is negatively 
affected. The robustness check performed by using alternative measures of global 
diversification confirms the finding that firms involved in both global and product 
diversification strategies will be less valuable than those which are only globally 
diversified. In other words, the strategy of being diversified in different business and 
geographic segments at the same time is more destructive of value.  
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III.5.4. The Impact of Institutional Factors Effect on the Relationship between Global 
Diversification and Excess Value 
 
 Table III.6 presents preliminary results on the impact of institutional factors on 
the global diversification strategy. This table reports a mean comparison analysis of 
excess value and the degree of global diversification across legal and financial systems. 
As shown in Panel A, the mean excess value is positive for global firms operating in 
countries characterized by having their core business in common law countries (0.01), 
whereas it is negative for global firms having their core operations in civil law countries 
(-0.24). The difference in mean excess values between these two groups is statistically 
significant, as reported by the mean difference test. Moreover, the figures in Panel A 
show significantly higher levels of global diversification of firms operating in civil law 
countries than of their common law counterparts; this might suggest that civil law firms 
use a global diversification strategy more in order to exploit the different markets 
(bearing in mind the close proximity and variety of their cross-borders countries) as 
compared to our sample of common law home firms.  
 The analysis in panel B also shows significant differences in mean excess values 
across different financial systems. Particularly, mean excess value of global firms having 
their core business in countries with market-oriented systems is positive (0.03), while 
that of firms operating in bank-oriented environments is negative (-0.23). Additionally, 
mean values of entropy shows higher levels of product diversification in bank-oriented 
financial systems than in market-oriented-ones. Although preliminary, these results are 
in line with our Hypothesis 3, according to which the relationship between global 
diversification and firm value depends on: i) the legal system and ii) the financial 
system. Specifically, it seems that the benefits of being globally diversified outweigh the 
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costs of this strategy for firms in countries characterized by a common law tradition and 
market-oriented financial systems; and the contrary occurs in their civil law and bank-
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Table III.6. 
Differences between Civil Law and Common Law Global Firms and between Bank-
Oriented and Market-Oriented Global Firms  
 
 
PANEL A.  
Excess Value 
 
Legal system Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Civil law 3214 -0.24 (0.61) 






Legal system Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Civil law 3214 0.85 (0.38) 






Financial system Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Bank-oriented 3358 -0.23 (0.61) 






Financial system Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Bank-oriented 3358 -0.85 (0.38) 
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 Table III.7 presents the GMM results of Equation (3) where the moderating roles 
of legal and financial systems are analysed. As shown in Column I, we find a positive 
effect of global diversification on excess value for global firms operating in common 
law countries [(-0.331)+(0.622)= 0.291],  which is statistically different from zero (see 
the t statistic), while this effect is negative for firms in civil law countries (-0.331).  The 
results align with those of La Porta et al. (1997) and suggest that, since common law 
facilitates access to equity markets, then globally diversified firms are more valuable in 
common law countries than in civil law ones. In short, these findings suggest that firms 
operating in countries characterized by stronger investor protection are able to exploit 
better the benefits of having operations in foreign markets because they expand their 
market opportunities, diversify risks and increment market power. This explains why 
global firms in common law countries trade at a premium (Hypothesis 1.a) whereas their 
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Table III.7.  
Estimation Results of the Moderating Role of Legal and Financial Systems on the Value 
of Global Diversification. 
  
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table III.1. LSit is a dummy variable that 
takes the following values: a) 1 for common law countries and 0 for civil law countries reported in column 
I; b) FSit 1 if the country is classified as a Market-oriented System and 0 if it is considered a Bank-oriented 
System in columns II. The rest of the information needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity 
consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively; iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of 
the time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of 
no significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals 

















GPit_LSit  0.622* 
(0.0918) 
 



































m1 -14.64 -14.63 
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 Column II of Table III.7 reports a negative coefficient for globally diversified 
firms in bank-oriented systems (-0.320) and a positive coefficient for global firms 
operating in market-oriented systems [(-0.320) + (0.642) = 0.322, statistically different 
from zero, see the t statistic]. These findings reveal that global diversification creates 
value when firms operate in countries characterized by market-oriented financial 
systems, while a destruction of value exists in global firms operating under bank-
oriented financial systems. 
 Overall, our findings provide support to Hypothesis 3 about the moderating 
effect of the legal and financial systems on the valuation of global firms. Specifically, 
we find a premium in the valuation of globally diversified firms having their core 
business in countries with a common law tradition and market-oriented financial 




III.5.5. The Impact of Institutional Factors and Product Diversification on the 
Relationship between Global Diversification and Excess Value 
 
Finally, we examine how the legal and financial systems affect the interaction 
between the product and global diversification strategies examined in Sub-section 
III.5.3. To test this last hypothesis we have used Equation (4) and the results of the 
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Table III.8. 
 Estimation Results of the Moderating Role of Product Diversification, and Legal and 
Financial Systems on the Value of Global Diversification.  








































t1 -10.1256 -9.0005 
t2 5.4773 4.5863 













m1 -14.74 -14.71 
m2 -1.06 -1.02 




The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table III.1. PDit is a dummy variable that 
takes the following values: a)1 for the companies with high degree of product diversification strategies 
and 0 for the companies with low degree of product diversification, this index was constructed using the 
Total Entropy measure of product diversification. LSit is a dummy variable that takes the following 
values: a) 1 for common law countries and 0 for civil law countries reported in column I; b) FSit1 if the 
country is classified as a Market-oriented System and 0 if it is considered a Bank-oriented System in 
columns II. The rest of the information needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent 
asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively; iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the time 
dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in 
first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
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The results in Column I provide evidence on the joint impact of product 
diversification and legal origin on the value of global diversification. As explained in 
Sub-section III.3, we have tested this joint impact by interacting global diversification 
simultaneously with two dummies variables (PDit and LSit) accounting for the degree of 
product diversification and the legal system, respectively. The reported coefficient of 
global diversification in firms working with low levels of product diversification in civil 
law countries (-0.249,) is negative. These firms seem to trade at discount. However, their 
common law counterparts seem to be well valued by their markets, since the coefficient 
is positive and significant in this case [(-0.249) + (-0.139) + (0.634) =  0.385, 
significantly different from zero, see the t statistic]. With respect to the globally 
diversified firms with a high degree of product diversification, the results show a 
discount for firms in civil law countries [(-0.249) + (-0.139) =  -0.388, significantly 
different from zero, see t2], and a premium for firms in common law countries [(-
0.249)+(-0.139) + (0.634) = 0.246, significantly different from zero, see t3].   Τhe results 
for the alternative global diversification measures corroborate this evidence. It is worth 
noting that these results are in line with our previous findings on the moderating effect 
of the level of product diversification, as well as of the legal and financial systems on the 
valuation of globally diversified firms. And, more importantly, the joint interaction test 
performed here goes further by showing that firms that diversify into different business 
and geographic segments at the same time trade at a premium if their home country is 
common law in origin, and trade at a discount if they operate their core business in a 
civil law country. This evidence suggests that diversification strategies (both global and 
product) are more costly for firms in civil law countries. 
An additional implication of our findings is that global firms having operations in 
common law countries will be more highly valued than those operating in civil law 
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countries, which corroborates the results reported in the previous sub-section. But, more 
importantly, the premium or discount of global firms given their home legal system is 
moderated by the extent of product diversification. Particularly, the value premium of 
global firms head-quartered in common law countries is larger when lower levels of 
product diversification are chosen. And similarly, the value discount of global firms 
head-quartered in civil law countries is smaller if these firms opt for low levels of 
product diversification. This evidence is in line with that provided in Sub-section III.5.3 
about the higher costs of simultaneously diversifying into different business and global 
segments, because operations in new product and global markets will be more difficult 
to manage.  
 The joint impact of product diversification and the orientation of the financial 
system on the valuation of global firms is tested by replacing the LSit dummy variable 
with FSit in Equation (4). The estimation results are presented in Column II of Table 
III.8. The effect of global diversification on excess value in firms with low levels of 
product diversification is negative under bank-oriented systems (-0.276), whereas it is 
positive under market-oriented systems [(-0.276) + (0.691) = 0.415, significantly 
different from zero, see the t statistic]. Similar results are obtained for globally 
diversified firms with a high level of product diversification. Particularly, the excess 
value of firms with a high degree of multi-segment activity and global diversification are 
negatively related for firms operating in bank-oriented systems [(-0.276) + (-0.0888) = -
0.364, significantly different from zero, see t2], and positively related for firms operating 
in market-oriented systems [(-0.276) + (-0.088) + (0.691)  = 0.326, significantly different 
from zero, see t3]. The results of the robustness tests performed by using the alternative 
measures for global diversification confirm these findings. As with the legal tradition, 
this evidence supports the previously reported results on the relevance of the level of 
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
91  
product diversification and the orientation of the financial system to the valuation of 
global firms. More interestingly, we find here that there is a joint impact of these two 
factors. First, firms involved in both product and global diversification trade at a 
premium when operating under market-oriented financial systems, and trade at a 
discount if they operate under bank-oriented financial systems. A potential explanation 
may be that firms in bank oriented systems are more prone to agency problems. Second, 
a high level of product diversification harms the valuation of global firms, since it leads 
to lower premiums in market-oriented systems and to higher discounts in bank-oriented 
ones.  
 In summary, the evidence presented in this sub-section supports the results 
reported in previous sections on the moderating role played by the level of product 
diversification as well as the impact of legal and financial systems on the relationship 
between global diversification and firm value. And, more importantly, this evidence 
supports Hypothesis 5 about the joint impact of firm and institutional characteristics on 
the valuation of global firms.  
 
III.6. Conclusions  
 
This chapter investigates how product diversification, legal systems and financial 
systems affect the relationship between global diversification and the market valuation 
of firms. While global diversification and its relationship with firm value has been a 
topic of interest in the international business and management literatures, the results are 
far from unanimous. By using a panel data methodology on a large data set of firms 
across many developed countries for the period 1990 to 2003, the results of this 
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investigation give further strong support to the discount hypothesis of global 
diversification; namely, that global diversification on its own destroys value.  
 More importantly, however, the results of this analysis show that the relationship 
between global diversification and firm value is affected by the firm’s level of product 
diversification and the legal and financial systems of the firm’s home country. First, high 
levels of product diversification increase the value-discount of global firms. Second 
globally diversified companies operating in common law countries and market oriented 
systems trade at a premium, whereas their civil law and bank oriented counter-parts 
trade at a discount.  Third, there is a joint impact between product diversification and 
legal/financial systems with firms involved in both product and global diversification 
trading at a premium when operating under common law and market-oriented financial 


















PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES AND 
DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS: A CROSS-COUNTRY 
ANALYSIS  
 
IV.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter investigates how product diversification strategies and dividend 
payout ratios influence each other.  Our approach is based on the idea of diversification 
and dividends being competitors for a firm’s resources (Mackey and Barney, 2005).  
Since a payout ratio is a mechanism which reduces the cash flow available in the firm, 
its diversification strategies should suffer an important impact in them because multi-
segment activities are investments used by managers relying on the funds available into 
the firm, then the extent of diversification strategies will depend on the payout ratios, 
and additionally, shareholders' premiums will be regulated by the extent of firm 
diversification strategies. Moreover, if the firm experiment high levels of diversification 
then agency and transaction costs will start to emerge and firm payout policy will 
alleviate this phenomena. 
Specifically, this study contributes to the literature in the understanding of how 
the product diversification strategy is influenced by firm’s payout ratio and vice versa 
besides to underlie their most common determinants (with censored models). Moreover, 
as there is not a conclusive answer as to why firms distribute a substantial portion of 
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their funds as dividends or why they prefer to invest it in diversification strategies, we 
attempt to provide evidence on this matter by analyzing the effect of the payout ratios on 
a firm’s level of product diversification as well as the effect of product diversification on 
a firm’s payout ratio. Furthermore we offer additional evidence of the determinants of 
dividends and product diversification in an international context. 
To achieve our aim, we propose two separate models; the first one examines the 
determinants of product diversification strategies, including a firm’s payout ratio, and 
the second one accounts for the determinants of a firm’s payout ratio adding a measure 
of product diversification. Both models have censored dependent variables29 and 
estimations are carried out by the Generalized Method of Moments30 on data from 
Worldscope for several countries ( Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, India,  Ireland, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The UK and The USA). 
The major results of the investigation are as follows. First, we provide evidence 
that the payout ratios of diversified companies are negatively related to the level of 
product diversification. The result confirms the role played by diversification and 
dividends as being competitors for a firm’s resources. Second, the diversification index 
appears to be negatively related to a firm’s payout ratio confirming our previous result 
and giving strong support to the view of a substitution effect between diversification and 
payout ratios.  Third, country environmental differences, including institutional settings, 
such as the legal tradition or the financial system of the firm’s country, as well as the 
level of the development of the economy, are key factors that underlie the effects of 
                                                 
29 The models are used with censored variables since some firms are diversified or pay dividends whereas 
others do not. 
30 Hence we use the panel data methodology that eliminates the individual heterogeneity and controls for 
endogeneity problems. 
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product diversification and dividends policies.  More specifically, we document a 
substitution effect between product diversification and dividends in common law and 
civil law firms, but this relation appears to be more attenuated for firms operating in 
countries with common law origins. Moreover, the same relationship is noted for 
market-oriented systems and developed economies.  In contrast, we find a 
complementary effect in bank-oriented systems and emerging economies 
Our study proceeds as follows. In Sub-section two we describe our theoretical 
framework, while in Sub-section three we explain our empirical approach, variables and 
hypothesis. In Sub-section four we describe our data and methodology, and the results 
are discussed in Sub-section five.  In Sub-section six we present our conclusions.  
 
IV.2. Background  
 
In this sub-section, we describe the product diversification strategies and 
dividend policies as well as their main determinants.  
 
IV.2.1. Why do firms diversify? 
  
We first turn our attention to the vast and diverse literature on the firm value 
impact of diversification strategies and then we move on to consider the determinants of 
diversification. 
The value discount associated with product diversification has been recognized 
primarily since Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) found a destruction 
of value in multi-segment firms as compared with their single-segment counterparts. A 
great amount of empirical research has attempted to understand this discount (Servaes, 
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1996; Rajan, et al., 2000; Whited, 2001; Lamont and Polk, 2001, 2002). Berger and 
Ofek (1995) associated the destruction of value with the fact that multi-segment firms 
invest inefficiently, in that investments are not directed to the segments with better 
investment opportunities (Shin and Stulz, 1998). Also during the course of 
overinvestment in low performing-businesses, multi-segment firms create inefficient 
internal capital markets (Stulz, 1990) and/or generate political, influence costs (Meyer et 
al., 1992; Rajan et al., 2000) - both of which might accentuate the overinvestment of 
resources (Stulz, 1990; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002).  A recognized reason for this state 
of affairs is that managers gain private benefits from acquisitions (Amihud and Lev, 
1981; Mork et al., 1990); for example, they can reduce their personal risk or increment 
their power, prestige and compensation (Jensen, 1986).  In addition, a firm may suffer 
control and effort losses (increments of shirking) and management incentive 
compensation costs (Rotenberg and Saloner, 1994) when diversifying as it becomes 
more difficult to manage the organization (Harris, et al., 1982; Markides, 1992).  Finally, 
although diversification translates into lower financial risk, it may increase business risk 
given the different nature and characteristics of the business to be managed. 
A firm value premium has also been recently documented in the literature.  In 
this respect, Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) criticize the discount 
hypothesis by arguing that previous findings do not control for the endogeneity problem 
on the decision to diversify, and explain that a diversification premium exists after 
controlling for a firm’s propensity to diversify. However, this increment in value appears 
to be small. The benefits of a multi-segment firm could arise from different sources; for 
instance, the coinsurance effect gives multi-segment firms greater debt capacity than 
single-segment firms (Lewellen, 1971). By creating internal capital markets, diversified 
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firms can access and use more efficiently produced and acquired resources31 (Lang and 
Stulz, 1994). Diversified firms can employ market power advantages (Scherer, 1980) 
that might derive from predatory pricing, future higher prices and cross-subsidization 
(whereby companies use the benefits from one product to alleviate the suffering of other 
production units (Tirole, 1995)).  The resource-based view of organisations explains that 
when economies of scope arise, a firm’s diversification strategy becomes one of the 
most appropriate techniques to exploit such economies (Penrose, 1959; Chandler, 1977; 
Panzar and Willing, 1981). 
   
IV.2.1.1. The determinants of diversification strategy 
 
 Firms with greater amounts of cash and investments have a higher propensity to 
undertake diversification strategies than firms with lower levels (Hyland and Diltz, 
2002), but excess available cash can result in an over-investment in diversifying 
projects.  In this respect Jensen (1986) supports the view that strategies performed to 
obtain high levels of cash flow will be translated into more diversification. In general, 
from an agency perspective, free cash flow is a significant positive determinant of firm 
diversification strategies. A firm’s leverage is commonly used as a factor to explain 
diversification on the basis that the coinsurance effect gives greater debt carrying 
capacity (Lewellen, 1971), as do increasing interest tax shields. As a result, diversified 
firms might pay lower taxes and have higher leverage than single-segment firms (Berger 
and Ofek, 1995). Moreover, debt is also considered as a factor which reduces the free 
cash flow problem in that it helps to constrain existing cash flows that otherwise could 
                                                 
31 Efficient internal capital models are based on the premise that directors have the opportunity to invest in 
the most favorable business segments; by doing this, they have to know the potential allocation of the cash 
flows (Stein, 1997; Morck et al., 1990). 
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be used by managers in negative net present value projects (Jensen, 1986).  In support of 
this argument, Berger et al. (1997) show that managers make efforts to evade debt.  
In addition, profitability is associated with firm growth and Hyland and Diltz 
(2002) highlight firms with low profitability try to improve it by means of 
diversification. As the firm is profitable it would have more capital to invest in product 
and global business units. Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lamont and Polk (2002) contend 
that firms located in low growth industries will seek to diversify into more rapidly 
growing industries.  To test this implication we include Tobin’s q ratio in our 
regressions. 
A firm’s intangible assets are fundamental to its diversification strategies. In an 
early study, Chandler (1962) provides evidence where firms with more investment in 
intangibles were frequently the first to go from single to multi-segment operations.  This 
is supported by the idea that firms diversify in order to fit and leverage technological 
change. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) explain that investment in intangibles gives a firm a 
greater potential to explore new business segments due to its diversity of knowledge.  
Moreover, one means by which firms can develop intangibles characteristics is by taking 
advantage of scope and scale economies through diversification strategies (Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1989). It is also well known, however, that intangibles are investments 
and firms probably have to choose between them and diversification.  
Finally, size is an important determinant of diversification since large firms can 
better exploit the resources provided by scale and scope advantages through their 
business units. In addition, larger firms have better access to capital markets and are 
more prone to be diversified (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Moreover, given incentives and 
benefits, managers often have every encouragement to expand their businesses via 
diversification.  
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IV.2.2. Why do firms pay dividends? 
 
Corporate dividend policy has been a long standing issue in the corporate finance 
literature.  For example, in their seminal paper of Miller and Modigliani (1961) posit the 
irrelevance hypothesis where dividend policy neither creates nor destroys firm value 
under well defined circumstances.  More recently, Fama and French (2001) address the 
decline in cash dividend in US firms across the period from 1978 to 1998. This decrease 
on approximately 53%32 in the Compustat sample is attributed to the firm’s 
characteristics that are publicly traded. Nonetheless, DeAngelo et al. (2004) in a similar 
study report that the amount of real dividends present an increment in time, additionally 
they argue that in the mean time an increment in aggregate dividends and a decrement in 
the dividends payers appears, this behavior is attributed to the rising concentration in the 
dividends payers.  
 The declining in dividends is also reported in the UK, but some differences on 
the US policies regard. The magnitude in the decline is reported by Ferris et al. (2006) 
who argue that this relation is lower than the observed on the US firms. Benito and 
Young (2001) and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) also find this pattern on the little 
evidence for the reduction propensity of UK dividends payers.  
 The European Union also have been studied, for example Von Eije and 
Megginson (2006) find a diminution on the proportion of dividend payers among firms 
for a 15 countries sample, they also control for profitability, size and growth 
opportunities like previous studies. However Von Eije and Megginson (2006) report no 
evidence for this propensity in their study due the inclusion of new firms over the time.  
                                                 
32 Fama and French (2002) report that the number of dividends payers declines from 1,988 in 1978 to 
1,045 in 1998.  The results show that only 21% of US firms paid dividends in 1998.   
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
100  
 Arguments for a reaction of the capital market in line with dividends changes 
also take place in the literature (Watts, 1973; Penman, 1983, Benartzi et al., 1997; 
Grullon et al. 2002). Empirical background pointed results out that dividends policy 
changes have an impact on the information about future cash flows, particularly, 
increases in dividends refer better news than decreases in them (John and Williams, 
1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). With this notion managers use dividends as a signal of 
future profitability (Allen and Michalely, 2002) because they have more information 
about the firm future cash flows than shareholders, and they have incentives to signal 
information to investors. An increase in dividends should mean sufficient cash flows 
expected by the firm and enough to satisfy the dividends payments without increasing 
the probability of bankruptcy (Bhattacharya, 1979).  
Mature firms suffer a declining in growth because they are prone to have smaller 
number of options to keep growing, investment opportunities are more distant to reach 
as well (Grullon et al., 2002), this may have consequences by way of signal that firms 
have limit growth options in its present business.  Miller and Rock (1985) conclude that 
dividends payers exit to exhibit a favorable signal of information to the capital market. 
In other words, it seem that managers react in the premise that markets give a premium 
to dividend payers and to interpret the stop in the payment as a bad signal (Brav et al., 
2005)33.  
 However the information of dividends have been questioned in the recent years. 
Moreover, Amihud and Li (2004) find a decrease in the proportion of stock price 
reactions to dividends announcements, although it is well notice that stock prices act in 
response to changes in dividends (Michaely et al., 1995). Another view is the one 
proportioned by DeAngelo et al. (2004), who report that dividends are augmenting in the 
                                                 
33 Managers with this idea must prevent the reduction on the dividend payments whatever happens 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1990)   
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concentration among small number of large payers, and this behavior is determinant to 
avoid the idea about future earnings changes.  
 Rozeff (1982) emphasized the dividend importance using the agency theory 
arguing that firms pay dividends and increase capital at the same time mitigating 
managerial discretion. The principles for these explanations are (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) in response to the agency costs attributed for the different goals of managers in 
line with the shareholders. The firm’s available resources play an important role in the 
dividend policy because it reflects the company ability to pay it or not more clearly than 
the current earnings, which in some extent are more sensible by accounting practices 
(Alli et al., 1993). Jensen (1986) explains how dividends reduce the free cash flow 
which managers would otherwise use to invest in projects that reduce shareholders 
wealth or used by their own. In terms of the dividends agency costs arguments, firms 
that experience great amount of free cash flow and moderated levels of the debt-
financing costs will tend to have larger payouts. However, companies with a large 
portion of free cash flow tend to appear in a risk scheme of overinvestment, therefore if 
they employ this cash to shareholders, managers could dimish this phenomenon and also 
obtain another benefits directly from the shareholders. In a study about the relationship 
between dividends, investment and financial resolutions Green et al. (1993) find that 
payout levels are not fully influenced after the firm investment and financial choices 
have been complete, so dividend decision is progressing during the investment and 
financial choices. In this vein Partington (1983) exposes that dividends are independent 
of investment policy. Moreover, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) give a perspective 
about the optimal payout policy is directed by the correct distribution of the firms free 
cash flow. They arguments posit that changes in dividends are optimally driven by the 
progress in time of prospective investment opportunities.  
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In addition, Easterbrook (1984) provides arguments on a partial raise of external 
capital are usually affected when increments in dividends appear. Likewise, the capital 
market will be more influenced by experts and suppliers who use this kind of 
information to monitor companies. In other words, periodic dividend payments get 
managers to ask for external capital for the new projects funding, doing that they exert a 
market discipline effect on the firm.   
 
IV.2.2.1. The determinants of dividends  
 
 Agency theory considers that high levels of resources in a firm lead to higher 
payout ratios in order to prevent firms from overinvesting (Lang et al., 1996; Lamont, 
1997; Chen and Ho, 1997; Chakraborty et al., 1999; Del Brio et al., 2003; Morgado and 
Pindado, 2003; Neves et al., 2006). Consequently a positive relation between a firm’s 
free cash flow and its payout ratio is argued to exist. 
 The financial literature widely supports the role played by debt and dividends as 
agency-cost control mechanisms (see Grossman and Hart, 1980 and Jensen, 1986 for 
debt; Rozeff, 1982 and Jensen, 1986 for dividends) as well as by mitigating asymmetries 
of information between firms and potential investors (see Ross, 1977 and Harris and 
Raviv, 1991 for debt; Lintner, 1956 and Bhattacharya, 1979 for dividends). This 
literature suggests that debt and dividends may be related, although previous research is 
not unanimous about the way in which they are related. On the one hand, the search for a 
trade-off between costs and benefits leads to a substitution hypothesis based on the 
minimization of agency conflicts without duplicating efforts (Easterbrook, 1984; John 
and Senbert, 1998). In others words, this hypothesis holds that high leverage makes 
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dividends less valuable, and vice versa34. On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis 
points to the complementary use of the different mechanisms as the most effective 
solution to a firm’s inefficiencies, because none of them can be a satisfactory solution in 
themselves without generating additional costs (Jensen, 1989)35. 
 According to Lintner (1956) managers prefer to increase dividends only if they 
believe that the new level can be sustained.  In these circumstances corporate earnings 
serve as the principal determinant of dividends (DeAngelo et al., 2004). Miller and Rock 
(1985) provide evidence on dividends acting as a signal but companies only willing to be 
use dividends in this manner when earnings are permanent rather than transitory.  In sum 
changes in dividends are highly correlated with past and current changes in earnings 
(Benartzi et al., 1997; Brav et al., 2005; DeAngelo et al., 2004). 
 Recent literature (see for instance, Allen and Michaely, 2002; Aivazian et al., 
2003), supports the argument that the nature of a firm’s assets influences its dividend 
policy. Specifically, Aivazian et al. (2003) show that the probability of a firm to pay 
dividends increases with the tangibility of its assets. Additionally, Barclay et al. (1995) 
point out the nature of a firm’s assets affects both its financing decision and its dividend 
policy. Firms with tangible assets can generally access the market for long term debt due 
to the existence of collateral and the subsequent ability to secure debt (Scott, 1977).  
  Finally, a firm’s size has been traditionally considered among the determinants of 
its dividend policy and previous evidence seems to agree that larger firms pay higher 
dividends. There are several arguments justifying the positive relationship between size 
and payout ratios. For instance, larger firms enjoy better access to the capital market 
and, consequently, are less financially constrained, which allows them to pay more 
                                                 
34 Subsequent empirical evidence on the substitutability of debt and dividends as cash flow commitments 
can be found in Moh´d et al. (1998) and more recently, in Lozano, Miguel, and Pindado (2002). 
35 Consistent with this hypothesis, the results in Eckbo and Verma (1994) show a positive and significant 
relationship between debt and dividends and, more recently, Zwiebel (1996) and Douglas (2001) confirm 
that firm value is optimized only when debt and dividends are simultaneously used. 
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dividends (see, for instance, Holder et al., 1998; Twite, 2001).  Additionally, larger firms 
are usually mature firms that are prone to pay more dividends in order to avoid 
overinvestment (see, for instance, Barclay, et al., 1995).  Fama and French (2001) show 
that the largest US companies have higher payout ratios and more recently, Denis and 
Osobov (2005) provide evidence of a positive relationship between the likelihood of 
paying dividends and size. 
 
IV.3. Empirical models, variables and hypothesis  
 
IV.3.1. Censored and basic models 
 
 Our main interest in this analysis is to test the implications of firm’s payout ratio 
for product diversification strategies and vice versa. Accordingly we have analysed two 
basic models that account for the determinants of the firms’: i) product diversification 
and ii) payout ratio. Agency theory arguments posit that diversification strategies and 
firm payout ratios depend to some extent on the available resources in the firm and we 
have thus specified two separate models: the first one giving explanation on the most 
common determinants of the product diversification strategy, including the firm’s payout 
ratio variable; the second incorporates the determinants of payout ratios incorporating 
the diversification variable. 
 A firm’s payout ratio has been widely recognized as a censored variable since 
some firms pay dividends whereas others do not. The diversification variable might be 
treated in the same way since some firms are diversified while others are not.  Following 
most of the empirical papers that attempt to explain the firms’ propensity to diversify 
(see for instance, Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004 and Ferris et al., 2007) we 
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use the following Tobit model to predict product diversification strategies for each time 
period from 1996 to 2007: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itititititit SIBDKCFKICPD μββββ +++++= 43210 //   (1) 
 
with  PDit = CPDit  if  CPDit >0 
          PDit = 0 if CPDit   ≤ 0 
where CPDit is a latent variable only observed when it is positive, whereas we only 
know that it is negative in the remainder of the cases. The variable PDit represent the 
product diversification index measured by the Revenue-based in the Herfindahl index36. 
The explanatory variables of the diversification strategy are: investment (Iit/Kit), cash 
flow (CFit/ Kit), debt (Dit) and size (Sit). Investment and cash flow are scaled by the 
replacement value of total assets (Kit), calculated as explained in previous chapters.   
Taking into account that CPDit follows a normal distribution with mean µ and 
variance σ2,   and letting   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) βμβββββ itititititit XSDKCFKI ′=+++++ 43210 //  
 




































where the first term picks up the observations for which PDit> 0 (that is, observations for 
which the diversification variable is observable and, consequently, the density function 
                                                 
36 The Revenue-based Herfindahl index, RH, is calculated across n business segments as the sum of the 
squares of each segment i’s sales, Si, as a proportion of total sales. Thus, the closer RH is to zero, the more 
the firm’s sales are concentrated within a few of its segments (see Berger and Ofek, 1995 for more 
details).  
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is known), whereas the second term refers to the rest of the observations for which the 
diversification variable is unobservable, and we assume that the function Φ(.) is 
distributed as N (0, 1).  
 We next proceed to censor the firm’s payout ratio in a similar way.  Following 
the model procedures by Auerbach and Hasset (2003) on the equality of sources and 
uses of funds we perform the following Tobit model that allows the prediction of the 
payout ratio for each time period from 1996 to 2007: 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itititititit KSHBKBKCFKICPR μββββ +Δ+Δ+++= //// 43210  (2) 
 
with  PRit = CPRit  if  CPRit >0 
          PRit = 0 if CPRit   ≤ 0 
where CPRit is a latent variable only observed when it is positive, whereas we only know 
that it is negative in the remainder of the cases. The variable PRit stands for the firm’s 
payout ratio. The explanatory variables of the payout ratio are: investment (Iit/Kit), cash 
flow (CFit/ Kit), increment of debt (ΔBit/Kit) and increment of shares (ΔSHit /Kit)37. 
Tables IV.1 and IV.2 provide the summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) of the product diversification and payout ratio variables 
obtained by the maximum likelihood estimation of the Tobit model in (1) and (2). In 
addition, the estimation of a Probit model including the same set of explanatory 
variables allows us to check the predictive ability of the models in (1) and (2). The last 
column of Table IV.1 provides the correct classification index for the diversified 
censored variable, while the last column of Table IV.2 reports the percentages of correct 
classifications for the payout ratio which are similar to the ones reported in previous 
                                                 
37 All the explanatory variables are scaled by the replacement value of total assets (Kit), calculated as 
explained in previous chapters. 
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studies. Additionally, the last row of the tables displays the summary statistics of the 
new variables, CPDit and CPRit, respectively for which the problem of censor is solved 








































Summary statistics of the estimated diversification measures 
                     
CPD07, for instance, is the diversification variable estimated by using a Tobit model for the year 2007 in 
order to solve the censure problem. Correct classification stands for the percentage of correct classification 





Summary statistics of the estimated payout ratios 
 
Variable 
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Correct 
classification 
CPR96 0.2950 0.0795 -0.6273 0.6835 79.10 
CPR97 0.2952 0.0846 -0.4650 1.0078 78.41 
CPR98 0.3142 0.0794 -0.8717 0.9094 75.32 
CPR99 0.2370 0.1087 -1.0360 1.5320 72.62 
CPR00 0.1944 0.1452 -2.2977 0.8991 71.82 
CPR01 0.1929 0.2026 -4.5839 1.715 72.23 
CPR02 0.1553 0.2297 -2.0490 1.9900 71.19 
CPR03 0.1249 0.2116 -1.8029 0.7850 71.75 
CPR04 0.1265 0.1717 -1.395 0.6988 72.73 
CPR05 0.1603 0.1752 -1.9325 0.9422 74.34 
CPR06 0.1821 0.1577 -1.1410 1.9238 74.97 
CPR07 0.2250 0.1048 -0.8470 0.5758 76.19 
CPR total 0.1968 0.1751 -4.5839 1.9900  
CPR07, for instante, is the payout ratio estimated by using a Tobit model for the year 2007 in order to 
solve the censure problem. Correct classification stands for the percentage of correct classification arising 
from a Probit model including the same set of explanatory variables. 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Correct 
classification 
CPD96 0.17004 0.1141 -0.1440 0.5699 61.21 
CPD97 0.1763 0.1116 -0.1332 0.5720 61.85 
CPD98 0.2086 0.1115 -0.1489 0.6121 66.01 
CPD99 0.2097 0.1120 -0.1422 0.6056 66.53 
CPD00 0.2415 0.1173 -0.1105 0.6580 70.04 
CPD01 0.2444 0.1152 -0.0873 0.6586 70.98 
CPD02 0.1111 -0.1031 0.6500 0.6500 69.70 
CPD03 0.2200 0.1093 -0.0812 0.6234 68.62 
CPD04 0.2130 0.1089 -0.1266 0.6118 67.99 
CPD05 0.2118 0.1049 -0.0717 0.5815 67.82 
CPD06 0.2080 0.1033 -0.1006 0.5660 67.55 
CPD07 0.2338 0.1203 -0.0860 0.6591 69.53 
CPD total 0.2166 0.1130 -0.1489 0.6591  
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Once the censor problem has been resolved for the product diversification and 
payout ratio variables, they are then used as dependent variables in the following basic 
models: 
 
ititititititititit SIIASQPROFDFCFPRCPD εαααααααα ++++++++= 76543210                (3) 
 
itititititititit SITANIDFCFPDCPR εααααααα +++++++= 6543210        (4) 
 
Where INVit denotes investment, Dit is the debt ratio, PROFit is the firm’s 
profitability, FCFit denotes free cash flow, IAit stands for the firm intangible assets, NIit 
denotes firm’s net incomes, TANGit are the tangible fixed assets, and SIit is the firm size.  
 
IV.3.2. Variables  
 
IV.3.2.1. Explanatory variables 
 
 Reflecting the discussion in Sub-section IV2.1.1, the explanatory variables 
incorporated into our diversification model are free cash flow, leverage, profitability, 
Tobin’s q, intangible assets and size. To understand the potential funds available to the 
firm for expansion and the agency mechanism of the correct use of the firm’s free cash 
flow, our model attempts to test a free cash flow index (FCFit) obtained by interacting 
cash flow with the inverse of the investment opportunities38. We compute a firm’s cash 
                                                 
38 Details about the interpretation of this index can be found in Miguel and Pindado (2001). 
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flow as CFit=NIAPDit-DEPit, where NIAPDit denotes net income after preferred dividends, 
and DEPit stands for the book depreciation expense.  
Leverage is widely recognized as explaining diversification strategies because the 
coinsurance effect may be utilized to obtain greater debt and to mitigate the existing 
problem with the available funds for the managers; the debt ratio is accordingly defined as 
Dit=MVLTDit/(Vit+PSit+BVSTDit+MVLTDit), where MVLTDit is the long term debt, Vit 
denotes firm value, PSit is the value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, and BVSTDit 
is the short term debt. We use in the numerator the long term debt since most of the 
arguments in financial theory are related to this type of debt (see, for instance, Miguel 
and Pindado, 2001 and, more recently, DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006).  
As diversified firms are usually associated with profitability since represent growth 
strategies, and as most of the literature focused on the premium or discount associated with 
their valuation we measure it as the earnings before interest and taxes fractioned to the 
replacement value of total assets (PROFit). To capture the effect of the investment 
opportunities by multi-segment corporations on the allocation across internal capital 
markets we use the Tobin’s q as SQit=(Vit+PSit+MVLTDit+ BVSTDit)/ Kit, where  PSit is 
the value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock. In addition, we include the intangible 
assets variable in order to test the repercussions of these investments done by diversified 
firms computed as the firm’s intangible assets scaled by the replacement value of total 
assets (IAit). Size is measured as the logarithm of the replacement value of total assets 
(SIit).  
 Moreover, to test the determinants of the dividend policies explained in Sub-
section IV.2.2.1, the left hand side variables used in our payout model are, free cash 
flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets and size. To capture the potential benefits 
of dividends as a mechanism to reduce the conflict of interests between owners and 
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managers with respect to the allocation of the firm’s free cash flow, our model 
incorporates a free cash flow index obtained as previously. To investigate whether there 
is a substitution or a complementary relationship between debt and dividends, the debt 
ratio also enters into our model constructed as before.  
To test Lintner’s (1956) predictions about the relevance of a firm’s earnings for 
its dividend policy we have included the firm’s net incomes, NIit, in our model, 
measured as NIit=(PIit-ITXit)/Kit, where PIit stands for all income before taxes, and ITXit, 
represent all taxes levied on a firm’s income.  
Finally, tangible fixed assets (TAit) are computed as the net book value of 
property, plant and equipment, scaled by the replacement value of total assets. Firm size 




We next discuss the arguments that underlie the link between a firm’s product 
diversification strategy and its payout ratio, and pose our main hypothesis. 
 
IV.3.3.1. The link between diversification strategies and dividends   
 
Being involved in multi-segment operations give firms the reward to perform 
mechanisms to overcome the market power advantages in relation to the fewer 
opportunities that their single-business competitors have (Caves, 1981).  This can be 
done by exploiting the firm’s specific assets in other areas (Bodnar et al., 1999) or 
markets.  As noticed in previous arguments on diversification literature, a focused firm 
is more limited in terms of investment (for instance, through cross-subsidization) 
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because it cannot so easily access to capital in terms of debt and equity since are more 
expensive than the resources produced internally39 (Lang et al., 1995).  Alternatively, a 
multi-segment firm enjoys of greater flexibility on investment since it can exploit the 
benefits of external funds and the internally resources generated across its business 
segments (Lang and Stulz, 1994). By using the within generated cash flow, a diversified 
firm can opt for the specific use to it, so it can incorporate resources to their best use 
(Harris and Raviv, 1996 and Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). An explanation of the 
superiority of the internal capital markets over the external capital markets is founded in 
the work of Servaes (1996), who posits that corporate headquarters have better 
information than external suppliers about the firm’s investment opportunities. At this 
respect, agency costs are supposed to be lower in small firms with plentiful growth 
opportunities and higher in firms where the capital is largely earned. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) show profitable firms with good quality investment opportunities tend to be 
forced between dividends payments and investments (such as diversification strategies) 
when capital market frictions are significant. Diversification and dividends are somehow 
related if a single-segment firm presents more difficulties raising capital due to capital 
market imperfections than multi-segment firms. 
Moreover, diversification and dividends compete for the use of the firm’s 
resources, on account of this competition if the firm’s available resources are used to 
diversify in consequence the dividend payments will be lower, and consequently if more 
dividend payments are made by the firms as a result they hardly diversified.  In addition, 
in a diversified firm context, it seems that managers prefer to use the funds owned by the 
company to invest it within the firm rather than distribute it in dividends to the 
shareholders, even if they are negative NPV projects (Stulz, 1990). Jensen (1986) posits 
                                                 
39 That applies when internally generated funds are well managed by the firm.  
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that managers of diversified firms with available free cash flows are more prone to 
invest in negative net present value projects than if they had operations at the single-
segment level.  Meyer et al. (1992) assert that managers of divisions with high 
expectations to arise in the field tend to influence the top management of the firm to 
redirect the resources in their way. Also the asymmetry of information in a multi-
segment company makes more difficult the alignment between central and divisional 
management, this translates in costs (Harris et al., 1982). Jensen (1993) also argues that 
the monitoring effect exert by external mechanisms on managers could mitigate the 
agency costs associated with the free cash flow.  
 
Hypothesis 1a. Highly diversified firms will pay more dividends since they can 
raise capital more easily than non diversified companies.    
 
Hypothesis 1b. Highly diversified firms will pay fewer dividends since 
diversification and dividends compete for the use of the firm’s resources. 
 
To test these hypotheses we have used Equation (3), and then a positive 
coefficient in the payout variable will support our Hypothesis 1a. and a complementarity 
effect between diversification and dividends. Moreover, a negative coefficient in the 
dividend variable will provide evidence for a substitution effect between diversification 
and dividends accepting our Hypothesis 1b.    
Dividends behavior in terms of capital markets have been broadly studied in the 
literature (Watts, 1973; Penman, 1983; Benartzi et al., 1997; Grullon et al., 2002) and 
the most explored repercussion is the signaling hypothesis by paying dividends (Miller 
and Rock, 1985).  In other words, it seem that managers react in the premise that 
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
114  
markets give a premium to dividend payers and interpret the stop in the payment as a 
bad signal (Brav et al., 2005). In addition, Easterbrook (1984) provides argument on a 
partial raise of external capital is usually affected when increments in dividends appear. 
By this way the capital market will be more influenced by experts and suppliers who use 
this kind of information to monitor companies. In other words, periodic dividend 
payments get managers to ask for external capital for the new projects funding, doing 
that, they exert a market discipline effect on the firm.  
Frictions in capital markets lead to a sort of competition between dividends and 
investment in diversification strategies as alternative uses of the firm’s resources. This 
competition could have an intrinsically meaning to the explanation of firms with strong 
investment opportunities often pay less dividends (Jensen et al., 1992). Furthermore, the 
small and unprofitable firms that had strong growth opportunities seem to have a decline 
in dividends payments (Fama and French, 2001). High payouts could be an opportunity 
for the underinvestment risk due the high expectation in external finance (Myers, 1977). 
In this reasoning firm may invest more by reducing their payouts (Cronqvist et al., 
2001). 
 The cash flow plays an important role in the dividend policy because it reflects 
the company ability to pay it or not more clearly than the current earnings, which in 
some extent are more sensible by accounting practices (Alli et al., 1993). Free cash flow 
arguments document that firm value should increase if over-investing managers payout 
more of cash flows as dividends investing less and less in projects with negative NPV. In 
short, managers might through cash away on negative NPV projects, in this instance 
dividends payment help to control this type of agency problem by limiting the 
discretionary funds available to them (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Jensen, 1986).  By this 
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way dividend payouts can be seen as mechanism to reduce the cash flow produced by 
the company to avoid the use of it for the managers at their discretion (Jensen, 1986).  
 
Hypothesis 2a. A firm’s payouts will be affected positively by the effect of 
diversification since external capital markets exert a monitoring effect. 
  
Hypothesis 2b. A firm’s payouts will be affected negatively for diversification 
since both are competing for the use of the firm’s resources. 
 
 Model in Equation (4) has been constructed to test these hypotheses eventually a 
positive coefficient for the diversification variable will hold the complementarity effect 
previously explained accepting our Hypothesis 2a. By contrast, a negative sign in the 
diversification variable will support our Hypothesis 2b. confirming the substitution 
effect relying on these two strategies.  
 
IV.3.3.2. Country factors 
 
Finally, we account for country factors and propose additional hypothesis about 
the relation between diversification and dividends depending on the legal, financial 
systems and developing of the economy. 
 Previous evidence shows that the product diversification strategy differs across 
countries (Khana and Palepu, 1997; Lins and Servaes, 2002; Fauver et al., 2003; 2004; 
Ferris et al., 2007); and the same trend is found on the dividend policy (La Porta et al., 
2000; Rahman, 2002; Aivazian et al., 2003; Brav et al., 2005). Moreover, the 
globalization effect has encouraged the firms to act in different environments and, 
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consequently, in other markets and geographic areas. Consequently, if we attempt to 
understand the forces that determine the modern corporation’s diversification strategies 
and the influence of payout policy and vice versa, it would seem essential to study these 
mechanisms from an international perspective. 
To investigate whether the characteristics of legal systems, financial systems and 
developing economies moderate the relationship between firm product diversification 
and payout ratio, we extended on the models in Equations (3) and (4) as follows:  
 
ititititititititit SIIASQPROFDFCFPRLSCDP εααααααγαα ++++++++= 765432110 )(    (5) 
 
itititititititit SITANIDFCFPDLSCPR εαααααγαα ++++++++= 65432110 )(               (6) 
 
where LSit is a dummy variable constructed to capture the nature of legal system. We 
follow La Porta et al. (1998) in the construction of this index. We then replace LSit for 
FSit to account for the moderating role played by the financial system. The construction 
of the index of financial systems is based on Beck et al. (2001) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2002)40. Finally, we replace FSit for EDEit to test for emerging and 
developed economies constructed as the criterion of the World Bank Classification.  
This way, the coefficient of the variables (PDit), and (PRit) is α1 for firms 
operating in civil law countries, bank-oriented financial systems and developed countries 
(since LSit, FSit and EDEit takes value 0, respectively); and it is (α1+γ1 ) for firms 
involved in common law countries, market-oriented financial systems and emerging 
                                                 
40 The exact calculation of the index is based on the ratio of banking sector development and stock market 
development of each country, so with these two measures they classify with respect to their median value, 
then values above the median are considered as countries with market-based systems and bank-based 
below the median of both indexes.  
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economies (since LSit,  FSit and EDEit  takes value 1, respectively). It is worth noting that 
in all cases whenever the dummy variable (LSit, FSit and EDEit) equals one, the statistical 
significance of the coefficient must be checked by performing a linear restriction test. 
The null hypothesis to be tested in these cases is the hypothesis of no significance, H0: 
γ1+α=0. 
 
IV.3.3.2.1. Legal systems 
 
 Recent research has focused on the link between law and finance, specifically on 
the role played by differences in legal systems across countries. The laws that protect 
investor have been widely recognized to have dissimilarities across countries, due to 
differences in legal origins (see, La Porta et al., 1998). La Porta et al. (1997) use the 
legal tradition41 as an exogenous variable to explain the legal protection for investors 
(shareholders and creditors) across countries. In their research, they separate the legal 
world in two main legal traditions: common and civil law. They study the implications 
on the differences of investor protection across countries, regardless of their obvious 
association with particular modes of corporate governance. They look at the ability of 
firms in various countries to raise external financing (either equity or debt). More 
specifically, they find that countries with common law legal origins have the best access 
to equity markets, whereas French legal origin countries have the worst. Relative to debt, 
common law countries provides better access than civil law countries origins.  
  Firms operating in civil law countries are characterized to have alternative 
circumstances for managers to explain their specific information on the perspective of 
                                                 
41 Most of the arguments found support on Hayek’s (1960) study on the superiority of English to French 
legal traditions. In Hayek’s analysis, the spontaneous order represented by the common law is more 
consistent with individual liberty than the more rationalist and constructivist (and, therefore, more 
interventionist) tendencies of the civil law. 
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futures cash flows to investors, and also when a dependence on internal funds to carry on 
projects emerge (Dewenter and Warther, 1998). Alternatively, insiders have the 
opportunity to transfer information to the major shareholders representatives, by this 
way mitigating asymmetries of information (Ball et al., 2000).  
In the field of diversification strategies research, there is no substantial empirical 
evidence about the role played by the legal system. However, Fauver et al. (2003) find 
that there is less discount in the valuation of multi-segment firms in countries where the 
legal system is civil law in origin, whereas product diversified firms operating in 
countries with an English legal system origin trade at a substantial discount. Fauver et al. 
(2004) find that the market value of U.S. globally diversified firms is discounted, while 
this is not the case for UK and German global firms. The attribution of these results 
relies on the fact that the benefits of diversification strategies (in terms of internal 
markets) are more valuable for firms in civil law countries where it is more difficult to 
raise of external finance.  Moreover, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) attempt to study 
whether global diversification varies across different institutional environments but find 
no support. Ferris et al. (2007) find a reduction in the discount for industrially and 
globally diversified firms and better excess values in civil law countries. In general, 
there is not a conclusive answer to the question as to how the legal system influences the 
behavior of product and global diversification. 
  
Hypothesis 3. The legal system will moderate the dividend payment in diversified 
firms.   
 
Differences in dividend policies across geographic markets vary systematically 
(Rahman, 2002; Aivazian et al., 2003; Brav et al., 2005); as a consequence, among other 
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thing, of the legal protection provided to minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000; 
Faccio et al., 2001). La Porta et al. (2000) argue that minority equity investors extract 
more dividends from controlling shareholders in common law legal origins countries 
because investors have the ability to use their legal resources to obtain more benefits, but 
this activity might be difficult when agency costs tryout superior levels, whereas in civil 
law one is more difficult since the effective protection to shareholders is less strong.  
Alternatively, according to the substitution model, insiders in order to issue more 
equity in the future are encourage to pay dividends to build a good reputation handling 
very carefully the treatment of the minority shareholders. Faccio et al. (2001) support 
this view and find that draws in dividends are higher in environments characterized by 
weaker investor protection (i.e. civil law), since they want to limit the expropriation of 
minority shareholders.  
According to the substitution model, insiders in order to issue more equity in the 
future are encourage to pay dividends to build a good reputation handling very carefully 
the treatment of the minority shareholders. Faccio et al. (2001) support this view and 
find that draws in dividends are higher in environments characterized by weaker investor 
protection (i.e. civil law), since they want to limit the expropriation of minority 
shareholders.      
Moreover, investors may prefer to have participations in firms where the payouts 
are larger or where the shareholders receive a considerable fraction of the earnings to use 
in their own preferences, mainly in corporations working in low investor protection 
environments, hinting the idea of lower payouts ratios in respect with high protection 
countries regardless of growth opportunities and other agency costs. Additionally, based 
in agency arguments, La Porta et al. (2000) find that dividends and growth opportunities 
will vary in civil law and common law environments.  Investment opportunities produce 
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a downward effect in dividend payments just in high protection countries and have no 
evidence for the counterpart legal system (La Porta et al., 2000). This turn into investor 
behaviors to claim for whatever dividend payments they can get due shareholders in 
countries with poor protection are not capable to be sure if they will receive some 
participation on the cash flows reinvested in high growth projects. In sum, they found 
that investment opportunities diminish the payout ratios only in high protection 
geographic areas (common law countries), but not in low protection environments (civil 
law countries). 
 
Hypothesis 4. The effect of the diversification strategy on a firm’s payouts will be 
moderated by the country legal system. 
 
 To test these Hypotheses, we have constructed a Legal Origin Index in Equation 
(5) for Hypothesis 3 and in Equation (6) for Hypothesis 4, respectively, that classifies 
the countries under analysis according to their legal origin, and it takes value 1 if the 
country is a common law in origins and 0 if it is a civil law in origins.  
 
IV.3.3.2.2. Financial systems 
 
Corporate finance literature has been employed to understand the differences and 
qualities of financial markets and banks as capital providers across countries.  When 
banks42 act as financial intermediaries it is clear that a bank-oriented financial system 
manages the situation of capital transfer.  Alternatively, a capital-market oriented system 
                                                 
42 Or other financial institutions providing similar services, respectively of whether or not they are closely 
related to banks. 
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provides those services directly in the stock markets43.  In short, bank-oriented financial 
systems are predominantly found in continental Europe and Japan, and the typical 
examples of market oriented systems are the US and the UK.  As a result of the study 
about the dichotomy between market-oriented and bank-oriented financial systems of 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), several papers have been performed to understand this 
phenomenon (see for instance, Levine, 2002; Beck and Levine, 2002 and Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). 
Financial systems are very useful in the institutional environment since they 
provide automatically capital formation, facilitation of risk sharing, information 
production and monitoring. The fundamental question is which financial system 
provides greater benefits to firms, and how this superiority varies across the operational 
countries environments (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In the literature, some authors argue 
that market-based systems are intrinsically superior (Macey, 1998), while others 
underscore the intrinsic value of banks (Gilson and Roe, 1993).  It seems that agency 
problems are also associated with the success of one system over another; more 
specifically, firms in industries with consistent state verification make use of the 
financial markets, and firms that require high levels of monitoring tend to be in bank 
systems (Boot and Thakor, 1997). Bank-based systems on their own fit situations with 
low contractibility combined with high capital scarcity relative to investment 
opportunity. Market based systems offer better yields in environments characterized by 
high contractibility and high capital availability relative to investment opportunities 
(implying growth opportunities).  
 Evidence on the influence of the capital market development on diversification 
strategies has received scarce attention in the literature. Moreover, Fauver et al. (2003) 
                                                 
43 As a main regulator factor in capital-market financial system is the law of supply and demand.  
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find that the discount of diversified firms is less pronounced in countries where capital 
markets are less developed, while it is higher in countries with well established capital 
markets and better structural conditions. They argue that diversified firms obtain benefits 
from internal capital markets, especially in countries with costly and less developed 
external capital markets.   
 
Hypothesis 5. The financial system will moderate the payout of diversified 
companies. 
 
 Regarding dividends, no empirical evidence is found hitherto. Using on the one 
hand Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) arguments on the substitution of equity 
for debt financing in countries with developed stock markets, managers will be concern 
to proceed in line with shareholders interest to preserve a high-quality name in the 
capital market. On the other hand, as Gilson and Roe (1993) suggest, banks-oriented 
systems provide a great monitoring effect. Consequently, dividend payments arise as a 
solution for this objective (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984).  
 
Hypothesis 6. The effect of diversification on a firm’s payout ratio will depend on 
the country financial system. 
 
 These hypotheses can be tested by substituting the dummy variable in Equation 
(5) and in Equation (6) (for Hypothesis 5 and 6, respectively) by another dummy 
variable, FSit which takes value of 0 for firms operating under bank-oriented financial 
system and 1 for firms in market-oriented financial systems. 
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IV.3.3.2.3. Emerging and Developed Economies 
 
 Nowadays, it is important to highlight the performance of firms operating in 
emerging markets. They are involved in great diversification, growth projection and 
incomparable revenues possibilities. In the middle of the 90’s, emerging economies were 
involved in transitional changes like privatizations, more regulation in their currencies 
and democratically governments.  
In emerging markets it is usual that firms enjoy of greater levels of asymmetry 
information and agency problems and other markets imperfections44. Lins and Servaes 
(2002) posit that diversified firms may take advantage of the internal capital markets or, 
otherwise, been subject of the expropriation of minority shareholders in emerging 
economies. At this respect, they argue that multi-segment firms in emerging economies 
trade at a discount. Moreover, Lin and Su (2008) find higher valuation for diversified 
firms as compared to single-segment firms in less developed contexts. A possible 
explanation to this value premium is that diversified firms in developing countries are 
able to emulate the strategies of their counterparts in developed countries and then 
exploit their current institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) Subsequently, Khana and 
Palepu (2000), in a diversified group firm study, provide evidence that the behaviour of 
these multi-segment firms vary from less developed to developed countries due to 
corporate governance schemes and the level of capital market integration.     
  
Hypothesis 7. The developed of the economy will moderate the payout ratio of 
diversified companies. 
 
                                                 
44 Khanna and Palepu (2000), argue that financial markets in emerging economies suffer inadequate 
disclosure and weak corporate governance and control mechanisms. 
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Emerging markets have been explored also to explain the divided behavior (Glen 
et al., 1995). Emerging markets are subject to global equity investments, because 
investors are seeking growth and expect good dividends payments in line to exploit 
some government regulations. Studies about dividend policies in different developed 
countries drop the common result that firms follow stable dividend policies (Chateu, 
1979; Leithner and Zimmermann, 1993; Lasfer, 1996). However, Glen et al. (1995), 
found differences between dividend policies across developed and emerging market 
economies and firms in emerging markets do not follow stable dividend policies. 
Moreover, Aivazian et al. (2003), find the same pattern in dividend policy for emerging 
markets and US firms.  
 
Hypothesis 8. The effect of diversification on a firm’s payout ratio will depend on 
the level of development of the economic system. 
 
To test these hypotheses, we have constructed several indices. The first one, 
Legal Origin index, classifies the countries under analysis according to their legal origin, 
and it takes value 1 if the country is as a common law country and 0 if it is a civil law 
one. The second one, Financial System, gives the value of 0 for firms operating under 
bank-oriented financial system and 1 for firms in market-oriented financial systems. 
Finally the third index classified emerging economies taking the value of 1 and 
developed economies with the value of 0.   
 These hypotheses can be tested by substituting the dummy variable in Equation 
(5) and in Equation (6) (for hypothesis 7 and 8, respectively) by another dummy 
variable, EDEit which classified emerging economies taking the value of 1 and 
developed economies with the value of 0. 
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IV.4. Data and Methodology 
 
 To test the hypotheses posed in the previous sub-section we use data from 29 
countries. These countries represent a great diversity of institutional environments.  The 
selection of sample countries is motivated by the existence of distinct financial and 
institutional settings prevailing all over the world. For each country we construct an 
unbalanced panel of non-financial companies whose information was available for a least 
six consecutive years from 1996 to 200745. This strong requirement is a necessary 
condition since we lost one-year data in the construction of some variables, we lost 
another year-data because of the estimation of the model in first differences, and four 
consecutive year information is required in order to test for second-order serial 
correlation, as Arellano and Bond (1991) point out. We need to test for the second-order 
serial correlation because our estimation method, the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) is based on this assumption.  
From our first country sample (34 countries) we have excluded those countries 
that provide mandatory dividends. In addition, economies that do not satisfy with the 
data requirements for multi-segment companies have also been omitted because we do 
not have sufficient information to construct several variables. The structure of the 
samples by number of companies and number of observations per country is provided in 
Table IV.3. As shown in Table IV.3, the resultant unbalanced panel comprises 3,628 
companies and 28,143 observations. Using an unbalanced panel for a long period (12 
years) is the best way to resolve the issue of survival bias because some firms will be 
delisted and, consequently, dropped from the database.     
                                                 
45 We restrict our analysis to non-financial companies because financial companies have their own 
specificity. 
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Table IV.3 














Austria 20 0.55 130 0.46 
Belgium 32 0.88 249 0.88 
Canada 99 2.73 710 2.52 
Chile 39 1.07 324 1.15 
Denmark 34 0.94 277 0.98 
Finland 20 0.55 155 0.55 
France 184 5.07 1352 4.80 
Germany 151 4.16 1142 4.06 
Hong Kong 162 4.47 1179 4.19 
India 145 4.00 1039 3.69 
Ireland 11 0.30 100 0.36 
Japan 420 11.58 4006 14.23 
Korea 182 5.02 1428 5.07 
Malaysia 326 8.99 2375 8.44 
Mexico 33 0.91 241 0.86 
Netherlands 53 1.46 448 1.59 
New Zealand 15 0.41 127 0.45 
Norway 12 0.33 91 0.32 
Pakistan 34 0.94 152 0.54 
Philippines 33 0.91 231 0.82 
Portugal 19 0.52 157 0.56 
Singapore 148 4.08 1035 3.68 
South Africa 88 2.43 611 2.17 
Spain 34 0.94 286 1.02 
Sweden 58 1.60 431 1.53 
Switzerland 34 0.94 271 0.96 
Thailand 75 2.07 470 1.67 
UK 343 9.45 2865 10.18 
USA 824 22.71 6261 22.25 
Total 3628 100 28143 100 
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
127  
 
We use Worldscope as the principal source of data, with variables such as the 
growth of capital goods’ prices, the rate of interest of short term debt and the rate of interest 
of long term debt being extracted from the Main Economic Indicators published by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) and from the 
International Financial Statistics provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For 
the construction of the product diversification indicator we use firms with reported 
industry and level segment data.  Following Berger and Ofek (1995), Campa and Kedia 
(2002) and Denis et al, (2002) we exclude firm-year observations with a missing value of 
total assets, observations of financial companies (SIC 6000-6999) and firm-year 
observations with reported sales in product segments higher than  the total sales reported 
by each company. Table IV.4 provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) of the variables used in the construction of the dependents and 



















Panel A. Tobit model to solve diversification censure 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
PDit 0.2920 0.2698 0 0.7985 
(I/K)it 0.0435 0.0942 -1.1664 0.9484 
(CF/K)it 0.0306 0.1019 -0.8220 0.6283 
(D)it 0.0993 0.1260 0 0.8879 
(SI)it 12.7475 1.9650 6.8719 19.8551 
Panel B.Tobit model to solve dividends censure 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
PRit 0.3108 0.3478 0 1 
(I/K)it 0.0435 0.0942 -1.1664 0.9484 
(CF/K)it 0.0306 0.1019 -0.8220 0.6283 
(ΔD/K)it 0.0052 0.1095 -4.7681 1.1362 
(ΔSH/K)it 
0.005812.747
5 0.0544 -2.1560 2.7572 
Panel C. Other variables for the basic models 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
SQit 0.9996 0.9169 0.1017 9.9551 
FCFit 0.0311 0.1556 -1.9228 2.3855 
PROFit 0.0477 0.1110 -0.8417 0.7603 
NIit 0.0164 0.1024 -0.9402 0.6188 
TAit 0.2909 0.1940 0.0000 0.9788 
IAit 0.0776 0.1335 -0.0896 0.9774 
 
PDit stands for the diversification measure by the Revenue based in the Herfindahl index. PRit denotes 
payout ratio, (I/K)it denotes investment, (CF/K)it is the cash flow, Dit stands for the debt ratio, SIit is the 
size, (ΔD/K)it and (ΔS/K)it stand for the increment of debt and shares, respectively, SQit is the Tobin’s q,  
PROFit denotes firm’s profitability, FCFit is the free cash flow, NIit is the net income, TAit  and IAit denote 
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Our models have been estimated by using the panel data methodology on the 
sample described in Table IV.3. Two issues have been considered in making this choice. 
First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, panel data allow us to control for individual 
heterogeneity and to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased results because of such 
heterogeneity (Moulton, 1986, 1987). This point is crucial in our study because the 
decision of undertaking diversification strategies and dividend decision in a firm are 
very closely related to the specificity of each company. Therefore, to eliminate the risk 
of obtaining biased results, we have controlled for such heterogeneity by modelling it as 
an individual effect, ηi, which is then eliminated by taking first differences of the 
variables. Consequently, the error term in our models, itε , has been split into four 
components.  First, the above mentioned individual or firm-specific effect, ηI; second, dt 
measures the time-specific effect by the corresponding time dummy variables, so that we 
can control for the effects of macroeconomic variables on the diversification decision; 
third, since our models are estimated using data from several countries, we have also 
included country dummy variables (ci) and finally, vit  is the random disturbance.  
The second issue we can deal with by using the panel data methodology is the 
endogeneity problem. Particularly, the literature concerning the diversification discount 
examines whether such a discount is the result of endogenous choices of the firm. Lang 
and Stulz (1994), for example, find that diversified firms trade at a discount even before 
diversifying. Focusing on firms that diversify through acquisitions, Graham, et al. (2002) 
find that the diversification discount can be explained by the lower values of the firms 
that are acquired. Campa and Kedia (2002) suggest that the discount is considerably 
reduced with proper controls for the endogeneity of the diversification decision. 
Moreover, the endogeneity problem is likely to arise in that the dependent variable 
(payout ratio) may also explain some of the explanatory variables. For instance, the 
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payout ratio may explain leverage on the basis of the arguments used to justify the 
reverse causality (see Sub-section IV.2.2.1). In fact, Jensen, et al. (1992) and Mod’d et 
al. (1998), among others, document the existence of a significant effect of dividends on 
debt. Additionally, there are also reasons to expect size to be endogenous, since, as 
Ferris, et al. (2006) point out; large payers have continued to increase in size over the 
last ten years. As a consequence, endogeneity may be a problem in our models that 
needs to be controlled for. That is why our models have been estimated by using 
instruments. To be exact, we have used all the right-hand-side variables in the models 
lagged from t-1 to t-6 as instruments for the equations in differences, and t-0 for the 
equations in levels as Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest when they derive the system 
estimator used in this study. 
 Finally, we have checked for the potential misspecification of the models. First, 
we use the Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions in order to test the absence 
of correlation between the instruments and the error term. Second, we use the m2 
statistic, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), to test for a lack of second-order serial 
correlation in the first-difference residual. Tables IV.5, IV.7, IV.8, and IV.9 shows that 
there is not a problem of second-order serial correlation in our models (see m2)46. In third 
place, the indicators presented in Tables IV.5, IV.7, IV.8, and IV.9 provide significant 
results for the following three Wald tests: z1 is a test of the joint significance of the 
reported coefficients; z2 is a test of the joint significance of the time dummies; and z3 is a 
test of the joint significance of the country dummies. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Note that although there is first-order serial correlation (see m1), this is caused by the first-difference 
transformation of the model and, consequently, it does not represent a specification problem of the 
models. 
 




In Sub-section IV.5.1 we first present the results of our diversification basic 
model (3), which includes besides payout ratio a set of control variables that have been 
traditionally considered as determinants of a firm’s propensity to diversify. We then 
comment in Sub-section IV.5.2 the results of our payout basic model in equation (4), 
which includes the explanatory variables that have been traditionally considered as 
determinants of a firm’s payout ratio adding the diversification index. Subsequently, we 
present the results of an additional analysis testing for the existence of institutional and 
country differences on the diversification strategy and payout policy. With this 
objective, we initially offer some explanation of summary statistics on Sub-section 
IV.5.3. Finally in Sub-section IV.5.4 we analyse the impact of legal and financial 
systems and developing economies on the relationship between diversification and 
dividends using our extended model (5) and between dividends and diversification with 
the extended model (6). 
  
IV.5.1. Diversification basic model results 
 
The results of the GMM estimation of our basic model in equation 3 are provided 
in Column I of Table IV.5.  The negative coefficient for the payout variable (PRit= -
0.00241) suggests that firm’s payout policies are negatively associated with 
diversification strategies supporting our Hypothesis 1b. Moreover, this result totally 
confirms the role played by product diversification and dividends as competitors of the 
alternative uses for the available firm’s resources and, the substitution effect between 
diversification and dividends is then confirmed. This evidence is consistent with the 
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arguments pointing out: i) firms with growth opportunities often reduce their payouts 
(Fama and French, 2001); ii) investing in more product segments lead a reduction on the 
payouts to finance this kind of activities or strategies for the firm (Jensen et al., 1992; 
Cronqvist et al., 2001); iii) managers use the available funds to expand their line of 
business according to their preferences by restricting the dividend payments (Grossman 
and Hart, 1988; Jensen, 1986). We can argue, managers of diversified companies are 
encourage to expand its current lines of businesses not taking into account the new 
business acquisitions since they are able to reap other benefits (Amihud and Lev, 1981; 
Morck et al., 1990) instead of use the resources to pay more dividends to shareholders. 
More interesting is to understand that the potential costs of diversification are also 
reflected in this finding since the costs of control, effort losses, coordination and 
incongruity between units business (Markides, 1992) lead managers to use the available 
firm’s resources at their discretion and to embark in overinvestment practices (Stulz, 
1990). By doing this, they will use funds to finance this kind of projects punishing 
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Table IV.5 
Estimation Results for Product diversification and Payout ratio models  
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table IV.3. The rest of the information 
needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) * 
,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of 
the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies and of the country dummies, 
respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, degrees of freedom in 
parentheses; iv) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 

















PRit -0.00241*  
(0.0005) 
 










PROFit -0.130*  
(0.0029) 
 










NIit  0.826*  
(0.0311) 














m1 -13.90 -11.81 
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Let us now comment on the results obtained for the variables commonly used to 
explain the diversification decision. The positive estimated coefficient of the free cash 
flow indicates that high levels of cash available in the firm are translated into more 
diversification, as the agency view support (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, this variable helps 
us to explain the above finding of the competition effect between dividends and 
diversification, since the free cash flow is positive related with the diversification 
decision. The positive effect of debt on diversification explains the important role of 
leverage in multi-segment corporations. This finding is in line with the coinsurance 
effect (Lewellen, 1971) that allows multi-segment firms for a greater debt capacity than 
single-segment firms, and at the same time with the mitigation effect provided by 
reducing the available cash in the firm (Jensen, 1986) that otherwise would be wasted in 
overinvesting practices. Tobin’s q negatively influences diversification. This is 
consistent with Ferris et al, (2007) and it could be that multi-segments firms invest 
inefficiently (Lamont, 1997; Berger and Ofek, 1995) and, consequently, their investment 
opportunities fall down. This relationship is also attributed to multi-segment firms 
presenting lower Tobin’s q than the median q for single-segment firms in their industry 
as Lang and Stulz (1994) indicate. 
Consistent with the discount hypothesis of diversified firms (Berger and Ofek, 
1995; Rajan et al., 2000; Doukas and Kan, 2006), our variable of profitability is 
negatively related with the diversification decision. Our attempt to explain the 
intangibles assets is not representative in our sample since we do not find significance of 
its coefficient. Finally, the size variable is positive, indicating its importance since 
diversification represents a growth strategy (Chandler, 1962), an opportunity to obtain 
the best from scope and scale economies (Panzar and Willing, 1981; Chandler 1977), 
and is also consistent with the findings of Berger and Ofek (1995) who argue that big 
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companies have better access to capital markets and hence are more prone to be involved 
in multi-segment activities.    
 
IV.5.2. Payout basic model results. 
 
Once the existence of a significant effect on the payout ratios and diversification 
strategy has been corroborated by our results, we go a step forward and investigate the 
effect of diversification on a firm’s payout ratio. It is worth noting that, as far as we 
know, there is no prior evidence supporting this view, and providing empirical support 
to this issue is thus one of the major contributions of this chapter. Second column of 
Table IV.5 reports the results for the model (4). Also in this case, the estimated 
coefficient of the key variable is statistically significant. The negative coefficient for the 
diversification variable (PDit= -0.0162) confirms our Hypothesis 2b and also 
corroborates our above finding on diversification and dividends as competitors for 
alternatives uses of a firm’s resources and the so called substitution effect between these 
two strategies. According to this result some support could be obtained from: i) multi-
segment firms prefer to use the cash produced by their internal capital markets to exploit 
more investments than obtain extra external funds  (Lang et al., 1995) and consequently 
pay less dividends; ii) managers of diversified companies have a preference to use the 
cash of the firm to invest it inside the firm rather to distribute as dividends (Stulz, 1990); 
iii) payout policy is conducted by the appropriately distribution of the available funds of 
the firms (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006).    
 Furthermore, the determinants of the payout ratio are also consistent in their 
signs and significance with our arguments. The firm’s free cash flow is positive; more 
than explain that this relation is consistent with agency theory (Jensen, 1986) due that 
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firms with high levels of free cash flow use the dividend payments as a strategy to retain 
managers’ discretion and prevent them from overinvesting, this result also help us to 
understand that as diversification, payout ratios are dependent on the free cash flow 
(Mackey and Barney 2005). An interest result is found in agreement with Jensen (1989), 
the coefficient of leverage is positive suggesting that debt and dividends are 
complementary agency-cost control mechanisms. A positive relationship between a 
firm’s earnings and its payout ratio is also confirmed. Consistent with Lintner (1956), 
increments in payout ratios followed by companies in our sample are in line with rising 
in their earnings in order to get a stable pattern of dividends and avoid dividend cuts. 
Concerning the nature of the firm’s assets, we find a negative coefficient for the tangible 
assets as the agency theory suggests (Ho, 2003). Finally, as it was expected, a positive 
coefficient in the size variable supports the idea that larger companies are prone to pay 
higher dividends. 
 
IV.5.3. Summary statistics across different samples  
 
Table IV.7 presents preliminary results to understand the behavior of our main 
variables across legal systems, financial systems and country economic development. 
This table reports a mean comparison analysis. As shown in Panel A, the mean 
diversification index for firms operating in civil law countries (0.34) is higher than the 
reported on the common law sample (0.26). This suggests that civil law firms use 
product diversification strategy more than their common law counterparts in order to 
obtain additional benefits from the different industries. With respect to the payout ratio, 
higher levels are found in the civil law sample (0.35) than in the common law one 
(0.28), telling us that civil law firms provide more levels of payouts than their common 
________ Diversification Strategies and Firm Value: Causes and Consequences. International Evidence 
137  
law counterparts. The difference in means between these two groups is statistically 
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Table IV. 6 
 
Differences between Civil Law and Common Law firms; between Bank-Oriented 
and Financial-Oriented firms and between Developed and Emerging firm samples 
on Product Diversification and Payout Ratios.  
 
PANEL A.  
Product Diversification 
 
Legal system Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Civil law 11219 0.3400 (0.2708) 





Legal system Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Civil law 11219 0.3521 (0.3471) 






Financial system Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Bank-oriented 10145 0.3563 (0.2620) 







Financial system Obs Means (SD) T-value 
Bank-oriented 10145 0.3604 (0.3366) 
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Moreover, the analysis in panel B also shows significant differences in mean 
diversification measures across different financial systems. Specifically, firms in bank-
oriented systems show higher product diversification index (0.35) and payout ratios 
(0.36) than in market-oriented systems (0.25) and (0.28), respectively. Finally, the 
pattern differences between country classification samples show more product 
diversification (0.30) in developed countries than in emerging ones (0.25). However, the 
payout ratio is bigger in emerging countries (0.34) than in developed ones (0.30), as 
shown in panel C.  
 As we noticed for difference in the diversification index and payout ratio across 
different samples we attempt to study more in depth their consequences by using our 
censored dependent variables with the extended models.  
 
IV.5.4. Results of the extended models 
 
 Once we have checked the existence of an effect between diversification a 
payouts ratios, we go a step forward and test whether or not the institutional context 
moderates this effect.  Table IV.7, IV.8 and IV.9 provide the results of the estimation of 
Models (5) and (6), extended to include the interaction effect between legal and financial 
systems and country classification on the relation of dividends on diversification and 
vice versa. The results for the commonly determinants variables in the basic models 
remain practically identical once the legal, financial and country classification 
interactions, LSit, FSit and EDEit are included in the analysis.  
 In column I of table IV.7, we find a negative effect of payout ratio on 
diversification for firms characterized by civil law origins (-0.00121), whereas this 
negative effect is stronger for firms with common law origins [(-0.00121) + (-0.00150) = 
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-0.00271] which is statistically different from zero (see the t statistic). This result may be 
explained by the efficiency of the internal capital markets in civil law countries (Fauver 
et al., 2003) as compared to common law ones. In short, these findings suggest that firms 
operating in countries characterized by weaker investor protection are encourage to 
obtain the maximum benefits from the internal capital markets generated by being a 
multi-segment corporation and, consequently, to have less negative payouts ratios. 
Additionally, in terms of firm’s diversified valuation, Fauver et al. (2003) and Ferris et 
al. (2007) provide evidence that the discount is less pronounced in civil law firms, and 
then, these firms are able to provide more capital to shareholders than their common law 
counterparts. Additionally, insiders in civil law firms have more chances to provide 
information to the major shareholders that result in a reduction in the asymmetric 
information problem (Ball et al., 2000). Subsequently, we find support for our 
Hypothesis 2 about the role played by the legal systems on the effect of payout on 
product diversified companies. Furthermore, our Hypothesis 1b is corroborated for both 
samples, civil and common law diversified firms, in consequence we support the 
substitution effect between these two strategies for firms in these legal systems. 
 Column II of Table IV.7 reports a negative effect of diversification on dividend 
payments for firms in common law countries (-0.0183), whereas this effect turns non 
significant in civil law environments. It seems that although common law provides better 
access to capital and more dividends (La Porta et al, 2000), agency costs are higher in 
these legal systems and, consequently, the effect of diversification is negative. La Porta 
et al. (2000) also attribute a downward effect on dividends in common law firms when 
firms are involved in investment. In short, this finding supports our Hypothesis 3 about 
the different relation between diversification and dividends in different legal systems 
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and it corroborate Hypothesis 2b about the substitution effect between them for firms in 
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Table IV.7 
Estimation Results of the Moderating Role of the Legal Systems on the Product 
Diversification and Payout Ratio  
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table IV.3. LSit is a dummy variable that 
takes the following values: 1 for common law countries and 0 for civil law countries reported in column I 
and II respectively The rest of the information needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent 
asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) * ,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively; iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the time 
dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in 


















PRit_ LSit -0.00150*** 
(0.0009) 
 
PDit   -0.00684 
(0.0082) 










PROFit -0.131*  
(0.0028) 
 










NIit  0.816*  
(0.0310) 
TAit  -0.0143 
(0.0145) 
t -4.2596811 -2.8155 
z1 11704.39 (8) 455.83 (7) 
z2 6266.24 (11) 716.44 (11) 
z3 15.64 (12) 2.96 (12) 
m1 -13.92 -11.95   
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Table IV.8 provides results regarding the influence of the financial system into 
our models. In column I we observe a negative coefficient for the payout ratio of 
diversified firms in market-oriented systems (-0.00430), while there is no effect in their 
bank-oriented counterparts. It is worth noting that although diversified firms in market 
oriented systems have more availability of capital to invest, they still provide less 
dividends.  We thus find only partial support for our Hypothesis 5, but our Hypothesis 
1b is confirmed for firms in market-oriented systems, then a substitution effect appears 
also in this financial system between diversification a dividends. 
As shown in Column II of Table IV.8, the effect of diversification on dividends 
is positive for firms in bank-oriented systems (0.0221) and negative for firms in market-
oriented systems [(0.0221) + (-0.0574)=-0.0353 significantly different from zero, see the 
t statistic]. This result supports our Hypothesis 6 about the moderating role played by the 
financial system in the relationship between diversification and dividends. Additionally, 
it supports our Hypothesis 2a on the complementarity between diversification and 
dividends in bank-oriented systems because of signaling arguments, the market 
discipline effect, and tactics to avoid over-investment processes by managers. In 
contrast, there seems to be a substitution effect between them in market-oriented 
systems, thus supporting our Hypothesis 2b, according to which firm’s payouts are 
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Table IV.8. 
Estimation Results of the Moderating Role of the Financial Systems on the Product 
diversification and Payout ratio  
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table IV.3. FSit is a dummy variable that 
takes the following values: 1 if the country is classified as a Market-oriented System and 0 if it is 
considered a Bank-oriented System in columns I and II respectively. The rest of the information needed to 
read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) * ,** and *** 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint 
significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a 
serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 



















PRit_ FSit -0.00430*  
(0.0009) 
 
PDit   0.0221** 
(0.0102) 










PROFit -0.131*  
(0.0028) 
 










NIit  0.803*  
(0.0305) 
TAit  -0.0639*  
(0.0171) 
t -6.5420 -3.8946 
z1 10234.58 (8) 466.07 (7) 
z2 6477.95 (11) 731.86 (11) 
z3 12.63 (12) 4.44 (12) 
m1 -13.93 -11.86 
m2 -0.45 -0.96 
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Finally in Table IV.9 we study the implications of emerging and developed 
countries. In column I we find support for the substitution effect between diversification 
and dividends for the developed country sample since the coefficient of the payout ratio 
is negative (-0.00233). However, there is no significance for the coefficient of payout on 
the emerging sample. These results thus support Hypothesis 7, and corroborate our 
Hypothesis 1b on the substitution between diversification and dividends for firms 
operating in developed countries. Column II offers interesting results. The negative 
effect of diversification on dividend payments in firms in developed countries (-0.0242) 
totally confirms Hypothesis 2b. However, contrary to this relation about the substitution 
effect, the diversification coefficient is positive for firms in emerging economies [(-
0.0242) + (0.0447) = 0.0205 significantly different from zero, see the t statistic] 
supporting our hypothesis 2a on the complementarity relationship between 
diversification and dividends in firms in emerging economies. More importantly, this 
evidence supports Hypothesis 8, arguing that these differences can be attributed to the 
fact that emerging economies are expected to provide higher dividends payments due to 
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Table IV.9. 
Estimation Results of the Moderating Role of the Development of the Economy on the 
Product diversification and Payout ratio  
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table IV.3. EDEit is a dummy variable that 
takes the following values: 1 if the country is classified as an emerging economy and 0 if it is considered 
a developed country in columns I and II respectively. The rest of the information needed to read this table 
is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) * ,** and *** indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint 
significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi 
is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) 
















PRit -0.00233*  
(0.0005) 
 
PRit_ EDEit 0.000124 
(0.0011) 
 
PDit   -0.0242*  
(0.0075) 


























NIit  0.821*  
(0.0302) 
TAit  -0.106*  
(0.0170) 
t -2.1571 1.3226 
z1 10261.37 (8) 502.98 (7) 
z2 6234.98 (11) 686.73 (11) 
z3 14.57 (12) 3.59 (12) 
m1 -13.89 -11.78 
m2 -0.45 -0.92 
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IV.6. Conclusions  
 
 There is not previous evidence on the role played by dividends in diversified 
companies and diversification in firm’s payout ratios by taking into account the censored 
problem. This chapter contributes to the literature by testing the determinants of firms’ 
diversification and dividend strategies, accounting for their mutual effects and using 
censored models and panel data methodology in an international sample from 1996 to 
2007. Then, extended models are provided that incorporate the moderating role played 
by the legal systems, financial systems and development of the economy in the 
relationship between diversification and dividend payments.  
 The estimation results reveal that diversification is negatively affected by 
dividends, even after controlling for the censure problem of the diversification variable. 
And the same pattern appears with payouts and diversification also after controlling for 
the dividend censure problem. The principal fact in this investigation relies on the 
substitute effect between diversification and dividends and vice versa indicating that 
both are competing for the firm’s available resources. Additionally, our results provide 
further evidence on the role played by different institutional context in diversification 
strategies and firm’s payout ratio. More specifically, the substitute effect between both 
strategies is conditioned by the legal system, the orientation of the financial system and 
the development of the economy, so the general rule of the substitution turns into a 















The increasing wave of literature on diversification strategies and their 
implications on firm value over the last decades have motivated the realization of the 
present document. As our outstanding contribution, we offer a complete analysis about 
the influence of both diversification strategies (i.e., product and global diversification) 
on firm value. Additionally, we go further on the question about the causes of 
diversification by providing evidence on the principal determinants of this decision, and 
the choice of giving premiums in terms of dividends to shareholders of multi-segment 
corporations. Finally, we emphasize the level of methodology innovation that conveys 
the use of data panel methodology and the estimation of our models by means of the 
Generalized Method of Moments. Additionally, we proceed to summarize the degree of 
attainment of the aims of our study.  
As our first objective, we raise the proposal of offering new evidence on the 
relationship between diversification and firm value, taking into account the types and 
levels of this strategy. On the one hand, considering the gains of being involved in multi-
segment business operations as scale and scope economies, increment of market power, 
reduction of firm’s risk, coinsurance effect and the creation of internal capital markets 
among others, give raise to the premium hypothesis. On the other hand, the discount 
hypothesis manifests the potential disadvantages associated with diversified firms as a 
consequence of the agency theory and the inefficient capital markets arguments. The 
joint consideration of both effects emphasized the notion of a quadratic relationship 
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between firm value and diversification, finding support for our non linearity hypothesis. 
Moreover, considering the different types of diversification strategies, we extend our 
study to pose our last hypothesis about the moderating role of relatedness on the 
valuation of diversified firms.  
In accordance with the specifications of diversified firms and to solve this first 
objective and provide new evidence to the Eurozone case, we specify 3 models testing 
first for a linear relation and afterwards for a non linear relation to the diversified excess 
value firms. The specifications of the second and third model have allowed us to obtain 
the breakpoints on the proposal relations by means of optimization, and not with 
subjective criterions such as the majority of the previous literature conceive. The 
innovative panel data methodology has permitted us to remove the unobservable 
heterogeneity across firms, and the model’s estimation using the GMM with instruments 
makes it possible to control the possible endogeneity of the diversification decision.  
Our empirical evidence confirms the destruction of value for diversified 
companies in the Eurozone area. This value reduction is consistent with the evidence 
pointing out that multi-segment activity: i) creates inefficient internal capital markets 
during the course of overinvestment in low performing-business; ii) generates influence 
costs; iii) encourages managers to invest free cash flows to support organizational 
inefficiencies; iv) generates control and effort losses, coordination costs and other 
diseconomies related to organization, and discrepancy for ideas between businesses, 
among others.  
The results also confirm the existence of a non linear relationship between 
market value and diversification and, therefore, the existence of benefits and costs of 
being involved in diversification strategies for firms in the Eurozone area appear. 
Moreover, we provide evidence of an optimal level of diversification, which implies 
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that, other things being equal, increases in a firm’s diversification level and creates value 
until this optimum is reached, and then diversification turns into a value-destroying 
strategy.  
Since we obtain strong support on a quadratic relationship, the relatedness 
implication of diversification on firm value has been studied as a non linear relation as 
well. Our results of related and unrelated diversification totally confirm the above 
findings. However, more impressive are the optimal points obtained for both types of 
diversification, suggesting that related diversification is more value-creating than non-
related diversification and that non-related diversification turns into a value-destroying 
strategy at lower levels than related diversification.  
This empirical evidence bring us to the conclusion that diversification is valuated 
as discounted even after control for the endogeneity problem, and that the differences in 
the levels and types of multi-segment activity outstandingly contribute to the explanation 
of the value-creating and value-destruction relation in the Eurozone diversified firms. 
As our second objective, we propose the analysis of the role played by global 
diversified firms on market value. To be precise, our primary primarily interest is to 
elucidate the influence of product diversification activity on the valuation of global 
firms, and if this moderating consequence occurs to check the implication on the 
discount or premium that conveys. Furthermore, with the aim of extending the existing 
literature, we have analyzed the sensitivity of our results controlling the legal and 
financial systems where the global firms have their home business. For these purposes, 
we specify four different models using the firm’s excess value as a dependent variable. 
Our methodology election was motivated to control the unobservable heterogeneity 
problems across firms, and the endogeneity of the global diversification decision.  
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Our first estimation model result shows that having operation on global markets 
destroys value. This evidence demonstrates that by working on global segments 
businesses convey trade-off costs as: i) transaction and governance costs; ii) inefficient 
investment activities; iii) liabilities of newness and foreignness. The costs of 
coordination difficulties, information asymmetry and lack of understanding between 
headquarters and divisional managers translate into value destruction for globally 
diversified firms. This behaviour points out that costs of being global go beyond their 
potential benefits.  
The consequences of global firms involved in high or low product segment 
activity produce interesting results. The negative impact of global diversification on 
excess value is larger for firms with a high degree of product diversification than for 
global firms with a low degree of product diversification. Specifically, the difficulties 
globally diversified firms face in terms of coordination, information asymmetry, and the 
misalignment of ideas between managers and shareholders seem to be accentuated when 
the global firm simultaneously opts for product diversification. In essence, we provide 
evidence that global firms with high levels of product diversification are more value-
discounted than those with low levels of product diversification.  
To further explain the behaviour of global firms on firm value we extend our 
models by incorporating the different legal systems and financial systems to provide 
another perspective. Our results for the legal systems (common and civil law) are more 
than interesting. In short, global firms in common law countries trade at a premium, 
suggesting that common law firms are able to better exploit the benefits of having 
operations in global markets because they expand their market opportunities, diversify 
risks and increment market power. Moreover, global firms in civil law countries are 
valuated as discounted as their excess values shown.  
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Regarding financial systems (market and bank-based), our results indicate that 
global diversification creates value when firms operate in countries characterized by 
market-oriented financial systems, while a destruction of value exists in global firms 
operating under bank-oriented financial systems. 
Once we had controlled and verified the moderating effect of product 
diversification, legal and financial systems on the valuation of global firms, we 
considered testing the joint impact of all these factors. The results are in line with our 
previous findings on the moderating effect of the level of product diversification, as well 
as legal and financial systems on the valuation of globally diversified firms. Specifically, 
firms that diversify into different business and geographic segments at the same time 
trade at a premium if their home country is common law in origin, and trade at a 
discount if they operate their core business in a civil law country.  The value premium of 
global firms head-quartered in common law countries is larger when lower levels of 
product diversification are chosen. Similarly, the value discount of global firms head-
quartered in civil law countries is smaller if these firms opt for low levels of product 
diversification. Moreover, the effect of global diversification on excess value in firms 
with low levels of product diversification is negative under bank-oriented systems, 
whereas it is positive under market-oriented systems. Particularly, the excess value of 
firms with a high degree of multi-segment activity and global diversification are 
negatively related for firms operating in bank-oriented systems and positively related for 
firms operating in market-oriented systems. As with the legal tradition, this evidence 
supports the previously reported results on the relevance of the level of product 
diversification and the orientation of the financial system to the valuation of global 
firms.  
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To summarise, there is a joint impact between product diversification and global 
diversification trading at a premium when operating under common law and market-
oriented financial systems, and trading at a discount if they operate under civil law and 
bank-oriented financial systems, and this creation or destruction of value is regulated by 
the level of multi-segment activity. 
The third and last objective of this piece of work is based on the premise of 
diversification and dividends as competitors of the firm’s resources. In fact, since 
dividends are mechanisms of reducing the funds of the companies, diversification 
strategies may suffer a significant impact in view of the fact that multi-segment activities 
are investments used by managers relying on the funds available to the firm. In this case 
the extent of diversification strategies will depend on the payout ratios, and additionally 
shareholders’ premiums will be regulated by the extent of firm diversification strategies.  
Specifically, we investigate how the product diversification strategy is influenced by a 
firm’s payout ratio and vice versa in order to underlie their most common determinants 
(with censored models).   Furthermore, to increase and provide more fundaments to the 
literature of diversification and dividends we have included the most studied 
determinants of both strategies. To achieve our aim we have proposed two models; the 
first one tests the diversification strategies determinants including a firm’s payout ratio; 
and the second one accounts for the determinants of a firm’s payout ratio adding the 
diversification measure. Both models have been censored in their dependent variables 
since the diversification index and the dividend variable presents this problem.  
Country environmental differences, including institutional settings, such as the 
legal tradition or the financial system of the firm’s country, as well as the level of the 
development of the economy, are key factors that underlie the effects of diversification 
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and dividends policies since the current firm’s era is more globalized. For this reason we 
provide an extended analysis by testing all of these factors in our models.  
The estimations are carried out by the Generalized Method of Moments, hence 
we use the panel data methodology that eliminates the individual heterogeneity and 
controls for endogeneity problems. Since the data quality requirements are very high, we 
have extracted our data from Worlscope database for several countries. 
Our results of the diversification model show that a firm’s payout policies are 
negatively associated with diversification strategies, confirming that these two firms’ 
activities are competitors for the available resources within the company and the 
substitution effect between them emerges.  This evidence is consistent with the 
arguments pointing out that: i) firms with growth opportunities often reduce their 
payouts (Fama and French, 2001); ii) investing in more product segments leads to a 
reduction in the payouts for financing these kinds of activities or strategies for the firm 
(Jensen et al., 1992; Cronqvist et al., 2001); iii) managers use the available funds to 
expand their line of business according to their preferences by restricting the dividend 
payments (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Jensen, 1986). In accordance with the most 
common determinants of the diversification decision we find that the free cash flow, 
debt and size are positively related to the level of a firm’s product diversification, 
whereas Tobin’s q and profitability present a negative relation with multi-segment 
activities. 
Once the existence of a significant effect on the payout ratios and diversification 
strategy has been corroborated by our results, we go a step further and investigate the 
effect of diversification on a firm’s payout ratio. Also in this case, the negative 
coefficient for the diversification variable corroborates our above finding on 
diversification and dividends as competitors for alternative uses of a firm’s resources 
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and the so called substitution effect between these two strategies. According to this 
result some support could be obtained from the fact that: i) multi-segment firms prefer to 
use the cash produced by their internal capital markets to exploit more investments than 
to obtain extra external funds  (Lang et al., 1995) and consequently pay less dividends; 
ii) managers of diversified companies prefer to use the firm’s cash for internal rather 
than distributing it as dividends (Stulz, 1990); iii) payout policy is conducted by the 
appropriate distribution of the firm’s available funds (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006).   
Furthermore, the determinants of the payout ratio are also consistent in their signs and 
significance with our arguments. The firm’s free cash flow, leverage, earnings and size 
are positively related to the firm’s payout ratio and a negative coefficient for the tangible 
assets appears.  
Once we have checked the existence of an effect between diversification and 
payouts ratios, we go a step forward and test whether or not the institutional context 
moderates this effect.  The results for the common determinants variables in the basic 
models remain practically identical once the legal, financial and country classification 
interactions are included in the analysis. 
We find a negative effect of payout ratio on diversification for firms 
characterized by civil law origins, whereas this negative effect is stronger for firms with 
common law origins. Consequently, we find support for the role played by the legal 
systems on the effect of payout on product diversified companies. Furthermore, our 
premise of diversification and dividends as competitors of firm’s resources is 
corroborated for both samples, civil and common law diversified firms, and 
consequently we support the substitution effect between these two strategies for firms in 
these legal systems.   
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With respect to the extended payout model the results report a negative effect of 
diversification on dividend payments for firms in common law countries, whereas this 
effect turns non significant in civil law environments. In short, this finding supports the 
different relation between diversification and dividends in different legal systems, and it 
corroborates Hypothesis 2b about the substitution effect between them for firms in 
common law origins.   
 Interesting results regarding the influence of the financial system are found in our 
models. We observe a negative coefficient for the payout ratio of diversified firms in 
market-oriented systems, while there is no effect in their bank-oriented counterparts. We 
thus find differences between the payout ratios of the diversified companies according to 
the financial system and then a substitution effect between diversification and dividends 
appears in firms operating in market oriented systems.  
Interestingly, in the extended payout model the effect of diversification on 
dividends is positive for firms in bank-oriented systems and negative for firms in 
market-oriented systems. This result supports the moderating role played by the financial 
system in the relationship between diversification and dividends. Additionally, it 
supports the complementarity effect between diversification and dividends in bank-
oriented systems. In contrast, there seems to be a substitution effect between them in 
market-oriented systems according to a firm’s payouts it is affected negatively for 
diversification practices due to the competition of the available firm’s resources. 
Finally, we study the implications of emerging and developed countries. In the 
results we find support for the substitution effect between diversification and dividends 
for the developed country sample since the coefficient of the payout ratio is negative. 
However, there is no significance for the coefficient of payout on the emerging sample. 
These results thus support the differences between diversified firm’s payments on 
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dividends in these economies and then corroborate the substitution between 
diversification and dividends for firms operating in developed countries. Additionally, 
the negative effect of diversification on dividend payments in firms in developed 
countries totally confirms the differences in these economies. However, contrary to this 
relation with the substitution effect, the diversification coefficient is positive for firms in 
emerging economies supporting the complementarity relationship between 
diversification and dividends in firms in emerging economies. More importantly, this 
evidence supports the argument that these differences can be attributed to the fact that 
emerging economies are expected to provide higher dividends payments due to some 
government regulations.   
Overall, the evidence we provide here points out that the diversification 
strategies have an effect on both creation and destruction of firm value, and the 
shareholders’ premiums and multi-segment activity are competitors for the available 
resources within the company. It is important to emphasize that all the effects related to 
diversification are conditioned to the different international contexts. 
To summarize, the thesis proved in this piece of work is as follows: “The 
diversification strategy can be value-creating or value-destroying depending on the type 
and level of product diversification and the institutional characteristics of the firm’s 
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